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 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN 
 
H-D U.S.A., LLC and HARLEY-
DAVIDSON MOTOR COMPANY 
GROUP, LLC, 
 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
 
SUNFROG, LLC d/b/a SUNFROG 
SHIRTS and JOHN DOES, 
 
Defendants. 
 
 
 
Case No. 17-CV-711-JPS 
 
                            
 
 
ORDER 
 
 This is a trademark and copyright infringement case brought by 
Plaintiffs, collectively referred to as “Harley-Davidson,” against 
Defendants, collectively referred to as “SunFrog.” SunFrog runs a website 
where third parties can upload designs and logos, place them onto clothing, 
hats, mugs, or other items, and sell them. SunFrog handles printing the 
goods and shipping them, and it takes the majority of the profits from the 
sales. Harley-Davidson noticed that SunFrog advertised and sold many 
items bearing its trademarks, including both word-marks and logos, and it 
filed this lawsuit as a result. Before the Court is Harley-Davidson’s motion 
for partial summary judgment. For the reasons stated below, it will largely 
be granted. 
1.  LEGAL STANDARD 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that the court “shall 
grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine 
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Boss v. Castro, 816 F.3d 910, 916 (7th Cir. 
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2016). A fact is “material” if it “might affect the outcome of the suit” under 
the applicable substantive law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 
248 (1986). A dispute of fact is “genuine” if “the evidence is such that a 
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id.  
The court construes all facts and reasonable inferences in the light 
most favorable to the non-movant. Bridge v. New Holland Logansport, Inc., 
815 F.3d 356, 360 (7th Cir. 2016). The court must not weigh the evidence 
presented or determine credibility of witnesses; the Seventh Circuit 
instructs that “we leave those tasks to factfinders.” Berry v. Chicago Transit 
Auth., 618 F.3d 688, 691 (7th Cir. 2010). The party opposing summary 
judgment “need not match the movant witness for witness, nor persuade 
the court that [its] case is convincing, [it] need only come forward with 
appropriate evidence demonstrating that there is a pending dispute of 
material fact.” Waldridge v. Am. Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 921 (7th Cir. 
1994).  
To meet its burden, the non-movant “must do more than simply 
show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” 
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co, Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). 
“It is well-settled that speculation may not be used to manufacture a 
genuine issue of fact.” Amadio v. Ford Motor Co., 238 F.3d 919, 927 (7th Cir. 
2001); McDonald v. Vill. of Winnetka, 371 F.3d 992, 1001 (7th Cir. 2004); Palucki 
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 879 F.2d 1568, 1572 (7th Cir. 1989) (“A party to a 
lawsuit cannot ward off summary judgment with an affidavit or deposition 
based on rumor or conjecture” but must instead rest on the witness’ 
personal knowledge). The Seventh Circuit has repeatedly emphasized that 
summary judgment “is the put up or shut up moment in a lawsuit, when a 
party must show what evidence it has that would convince a trier of fact to 
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accept its version of the events.” Hammel v. Eau Galle Cheese Factory, 407 F.3d 
852, 859 (7th Cir. 2005). 
2.  RELEVANT FACTS 
2.1 Harley-Davidson and Its Marks 
Harley-Davidson is the largest manufacturer of motorcycles in the 
United States and has long been one of the world’s most recognized 
motorcycle companies. For more than 110 years, it has continuously 
manufactured, promoted, and sold motorcycles and related products.1 
Harley-Davidson owns several marks relevant to this litigation. 
They include the word marks HARLEY-DAVIDSON, HARLEY, H-D, HD, 
																																																						
 1At the outset, it is worth noting that the Court set aside virtually all of 
SunFrog’s purported disputes as to the material facts. In many instances, SunFrog 
was simply mistaken when it said that the cited evidence did not support the 
assertion in question. For example, contrary to SunFrog’s view, the declaration of 
Harley-Davidson’s vice president for communications, Joanne Bischmann 
(“Bischmann”), contains an averment that Harley-Davidson has continuously 
manufactured, promoted, and sold motorcycles and related products for over 110 
years. (Docket #51 ¶ 8); (Docket #8 ¶ 10). This sort of error pervades SunFrog’s fact 
briefing. SunFrog’s failure to read the cited material carefully led to many 
imprudent disputes. 
 Similarly, SunFrog challenged a number of assertions as “a statement of 
opinion” that apparently should have no evidentiary weight on its own. (Docket 
#51 ¶ 8). This too is incorrect. Bischmann’s claim that Harley-Davidson is a world-
famous motorcycle manufacturer is sworn testimony that appears to be based on 
her personal knowledge; it is therefore admissible. Fed. R. Evid. 701. That it is an 
opinion is of no moment. See Von der Ruhr v. Immtech Int’l, Inc., 570 F.3d 858, 862 
(7th Cir. 2009); Fed. R. Evid. 701 advisory committee’s note (lay opinions by 
officers of a business are admissible “not because of experience, training or 
specialized knowledge within the realm of an expert, but because of the 
particularized knowledge that the witness has by virtue of his or her position in 
the business”). If SunFrog thought her opinion was wrong or biased, it could have 
produced evidence challenging it. And if there was some other ground on which 
the testimony might be inadmissible, like hearsay or lack of personal knowledge, 
SunFrog did not raise it. 
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FAT BOY, and SPORTSTER, as well as Harley-Davidson’s Bar & Shield 
logo, Willie G. Skull logo, and Number 1 logo trademarks shown below.  
“Bar & Shield Logo” “Willie G. Skull Logo” “Number 1 Logo” 
	
	 	
 
Harley-Davidson has used each of these marks, which will be referred to 
collectively as the “H-D Marks,” for many years in connection with 
motorcycles, motorcycle parts and accessories, and various other products 
and services, including apparel, mugs, and posters. The H-D Marks are part 
of premium brands and Harley-Davidson has a reputation for providing a 
wide variety of high-quality merchandise under those brands itself and 
through its dealers and licensees.2 
Given the incredible commercial success of Harley-Davidson’s 
motorcycle business over the years and its status as an iconic brand, there 
has long been a strong demand from motorcycle enthusiasts as well as the 
general public for other products bearing the H-D Marks, so they can show 
their affinity for Harley-Davidson. To satisfy this demand and to further 
build awareness of the H-D Marks, Harley-Davidson has for decades 
																																																						
 2Bischmann avers that Harley-Davidson has registered these marks in the 
federal and Wisconsin registers, as well as many variants thereof. (Docket #8 ¶¶ 
35–43). SunFrog tries to dispute this claim, noting that Bischmann does not use the 
words “Principal Register” (the name for the federal trademark register) in her 
declaration, nor does she opine on the current status of the registrations. (Docket 
#51 ¶¶ 20–21). SunFrog’s first dispute is only about wording and does not raise a 
real challenge to the registration of the marks. Its second dispute also falls short; 
Bischmann says that the company “owns” registrations for the marks in question, 
and her use of the present tense satisfies the Court, in the absence of evidence to 
the contrary, that the registrations have been kept current. 
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engaged in an extensive program of licensing the H-D Marks for use on a 
wide range of products, including apparel, mugs, and posters, among 
others. 
Consistent with its image as a premium brand, Harley-Davidson 
positions its licensed merchandise as high-quality, sold at a premium price 
point sold through select channels of trade. The retail prices of Harley-
Davidson’s licensed products typically range between $25 and $80 for 
apparel, between $20 and $45 for hats, and between $9 and $23 for mugs. 
To ensure and maintain the high-quality reputation of licensed 
merchandise sold under the H-D Marks, Harley-Davidson requires its 
licensees to comply with stringent quality standards, including that: (1) 
licensees must first submit product concepts and artwork for Harley-
Davidson’s prior written approval; (2) once the concept and artwork is 
approved, licensees must submit a pre-production product sample for 
Harley-Davidson’s prior written approval; and (3) once the pre-production 
product sample is approved, licensees must submit for Harley-Davidson’s 
prior written approval a production sample of the actual product that will 
be sold to the public. Licensees cannot promote or advertise any licensed 
products without completing all of these steps. As part of this quality-
control review process, Harley-Davidson carefully reviews the licensed 
products in numerous respects, including the materials used, the quality of 
the craftsmanship and construction, the design, style, and appearance of the 
products, and their overall quality.3 
																																																						
 3Here is found another of SunFrog’s puzzling attempts at disputing the 
facts. First, it says that these assertions are not supported by the record, (Docket 
#51 ¶ 14), but these exact words, or ones very much like them, are found right in 
the text of Bischmann’s affidavit, (Docket #8 ¶ 28). SunFrog further asserts that 
these assertions should be disregarded because “SunFrog has not been able to 
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According to its trademark counsel, Harley-Davidson’s trademark 
license agreements typically contain a provision that the licensee may not 
use the marks “in any manner that would disparage, tarnish, or dilute the 
distinctive quality of the Licensed Marks or the reputation and goodwill 
represented by the Licensed Marks or which would reflect adversely on the 
Licensed Marks, [Harley-Davidson], or any of [its] products or services,” to 
be determined in Harley-Davidson’s sole discretion. (Docket #47 ¶ 3). In 
addition, Harley-Davidson has various guidelines in place for reviewing 
the artwork and other content on licensed products, including prohibitions 
against:  
• depictions of religious symbols or language from any 
religion;  
• vulgar, crude, or offensive content;  
• satanic or excessively violent depictions of skulls;  
• display of guns or the word “gun,” except in rare instances 
(e.g., military motorcycles);  
• displaying certain of Harley-Davidson’s trademarks on 
licensed products, including the “corporate” Bar & Shield 
Logo with the text “HARLEY-DAVIDSON MOTOR 
COMPANY” that is reserved for corporate use; and  
• any modified or mutilated versions of any of the H-D 
Marks.  
Id. ¶ 4. 
																																																						
conduct discovery to verify the veracity of Plaintiffs’ statement.” (Docket #51 ¶ 
14). But why not? Discovery in this case has been open since at least July 2017. See 
(Docket #23). This latter contention popped up again and again in SunFrog’s fact 
briefing and its legal brief, so the Court will address it separately below. See infra 
Part 3.1. 
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Harley-Davidson has achieved significant commercial success in the 
motorcycle business, which includes the sales and servicing of motorcycles 
and the sales of motorcycle parts, accessories, and riding gear. Harley-
Davidson and its authorized dealers have sold many billions of dollars of 
such products and services over the years. Harley-Davidson’s licensed 
products business has also been wildly successful, with Harley-Davidson’s 
royalty revenues from licensing exceeding $400 million during 2005–2016 
alone, which translates into billions of dollars of sales of licensed products 
at retail.  
Apparel is a significant part of Harley-Davidson’s business and has 
been for many years. The majority of Harley-Davidson’s licensing royalty 
revenues are from its apparel licensees. Harley-Davidson currently has 
approximately ten apparel licensees and has had a similar number of 
apparel licensees or more for many years. For decades, Harley-Davidson 
has offered and sold, itself and through its dealers and licensees, riding gear 
and apparel bearing the H-D Marks, including t-shirts, shirts, sweatshirts, 
sweaters, pants, vests, jackets, and hats. During this same time, Harley-
Davidson has offered and sold through its licensees a wide range of 
merchandise bearing the H-D Marks, including licensees for mugs and 
posters.  
The H-D Marks have been extensively promoted nationwide across 
Harley-Davidson’s many product lines. Harley-Davidson markets and sells 
motorcycles, motorcycle parts and accessories, and riding gear, including 
apparel, under the H-D Marks through a network of more than 690 
authorized dealers located throughout the country, and through numerous 
other authorized Harley-Davidson retail outlets, including high-profile and 
high-traffic outlets (e.g., stores located at popular airports). Harley-
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Davidson’s apparel products are also sold online through harley-
davidson.com and the websites of Harley-Davidson’s authorized dealers 
and licensees. 
Harley-Davidson and its authorized dealers and licensees have 
spent many millions of dollars promoting the H-D Marks through virtually 
every medium. For example, Harley-Davidson has promoted its products 
and marks through dealer promotions, customer events, catalogs, direct 
mailings, national television, print, and radio advertisements, and the 
internet. For many years, Harley-Davidson and its dealers have sponsored 
sports teams and major sporting events, including prominent use of the H-
D Marks on advertisements or promotions at such events. Harley-Davidson 
and the H-D Marks have also received intense unsolicited media attention 
for decades. Harley-Davidson’s products and services have been featured 
and identified under the H-D Marks in numerous national television 
programs, books, national newspapers and magazines, and popular online 
publications and websites. 
The Harley-Davidson brand has been ranked annually for the past 
decade among the top 100 most valuable brands in the world by Interbrand, 
a leading independent branding firm. In 2015, Interbrand estimated the 
value of the Harley-Davidson brand at $5.46 billion. In 2016, Tenet Partners 
ranked the Harley-Davidson brand as the 11th Most Powerful Brand in its 
Top 100 Most Powerful Brands report of 2016. 
2.2 SunFrog and Its Business 
SunFrog is in the business of marketing, printing, and selling 
apparel, including t-shirts, sweatshirts, hoodies, leggings, and other 
products such as mugs, on its website. The website includes an online retail 
marketplace where consumers can purchase the products advertised 
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thereon. But the key feature of the site, and the source of much of SunFrog’s 
success, is that it also provides a “user-friendly,” “simple” online platform 
where: (a) “artists” can upload designs or artwork to SunFrog’s “All 
SunFrog Art Online Database” (“All Art database”) for application to 
products by the artists and by others; and (b) individuals or businesses can 
open accounts as “sellers” and create new products bearing their own 
designs they upload to advertise and sell on SunFrog’s website, and where 
they can advertise and sell products using designs created by others. See 
(Docket #57 ¶ 6). SunFrog itself creates no designs, graphics, or images for 
use on products, though when one user wishes to share his design with 
others, SunFrog is the intermediary and makes that design available 
through its website. 
SunFrog’s users can create online profiles and choose their own 
usernames. The sellers can, if they wish, be effectively anonymous to the 
public because they are identified on SunFrog’s website only by account 
names or numerical codes that may not reveal their real names or contact 
information. For example, SunFrog’s sellers include “harley davidson” and 
“HD,” neither of which are Harley-Davidson itself, as well as “LOKI,” 
“POKA,” “81088,” and “75237,” among many others. Nevertheless, any 
user must submit and verify an email address before opening an account. 
Further, to receive any payments from SunFrog, a user must have a valid 
email address tied to a financial service provider like PayPal or provide 
routing and account numbers for a bank account. Thus, SunFrog can to 
some extent identify individual users. 
SunFrog’s sellers create new products by selecting “blank” products 
(e.g., a t-shirt bearing no images, designs, or text) made available by 
SunFrog and then adding logos, images, or text to be printed on the 
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products. Using SunFrog’s online software, artists generate mockups of the 
finished product bearing their images or designs. As noted above, artists 
can share their mockups with other SunFrog users. If an artist shares his 
mockup and another user sees it and likes it, she may purchase from 
SunFrog a product bearing the desired design. In addition to printing the 
products as designed, SunFrog affixes its own trademarks and logos onto 
the products themselves, the products’ tags, or both.4 
SunFrog then advertises and offers these finished products on its 
website. For example, sellers have opened accounts, selected a blank t-shirt, 
and added designs displaying one or more of the H-D Marks in just a few 
minutes.5 
																																																						
 4SunFrog here counters that it is “merely a transaction service provider to 
third parties.” (Docket #51 ¶ 27). Not only is this statement not responsive to the 
facts in this paragraph, SunFrog’s evidence is its reply brief in support of its 
motion to dismiss. Arguments in a legal brief are not evidence of anything, at least 
nothing bearing on Harley-Davidson’s proposed facts. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Gross 
v. Knight, 560 F.3d 668, 672 (7th Cir. 2009); In re eBay, Inc. Deriv. Litig., Civ. No. 10–
470–LPS, 2011 WL 3880924, at *5 n.8 (D. Del. Sept. 2, 2011) (“Arguments made in 
a brief are not evidence.”). It is not without irony, then, that SunFrog chides 
Harley-Davidson for relying on one of its briefs for one of its factual propositions. 
(Docket #51 ¶ 116). And, admissibility aside, SunFrog’s cited briefs themselves 
have no affidavits or other evidence attached to them. See (Docket #28, #37). 
Whatever facts are stated therein rest solely on the unsworn representations of 
counsel. This is yet another regrettable error that pervaded SunFrog’s 
submissions. The Court will not catalog each instance; it has simply ignored 
citations to legal briefs unless otherwise noted. 
 Also present in this portion of the fact briefing are SunFrog’s many 
irrelevant asides and additional assertions of fact, unsupported by admissible 
evidence. See, e.g., (Docket #51 ¶ 31). This lamentable practice wasted the Court’s 
time while adding nothing to its consideration of the issues. 
 5SunFrog’s response is that its printers are fully automated and operate at 
the direction of SunFrog’s users, making it merely an on-demand printing service 
for user-created art. See (Docket #51 ¶¶ 28–29, 37–41). This position suffers from a 
number of problems. First, it is SunFrog’s gloss on the nature of its business 
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When consumers purchase products on SunFrog’s website, SunFrog 
handles the payment transaction and then prints and ships the products to 
the consumers. SunFrog’s printers are “highly automated” and print on-
demand when a user submits a design for printing. (Docket #57 ¶ 4). 
However, live employees do all the other work of the business, including 
servicing and running the printers, feeding the printers with raw materials 
sourced by SunFrog, handling and shipping finished products, and 
processing payments. Id. ¶ 10. Because all products are produced on-
demand, SunFrog does not keep any inventory of finished products.6 
In addition to creating and uploading new designs, sellers can also 
sell existing designs created by others that SunFrog makes available to all 
sellers in its All Art database. Pursuant to SunFrog’s terms of service, 
SunFrog automatically obtains a license from an artist that gives it the right 
to use and permit others to use the artist’s design and to make those designs 
available to all sellers on its website. The All Art database is searchable by 
keyword and categories (e.g., “Automotive”). Relevant here, the All Art 
database has made available to sellers numerous designs and artwork 
containing one or more of the H-D Marks that the sellers can immediately 
apply to numerous blank products of various styles, colors, and sizes, and 
																																																						
operations and is largely non-responsive to Harley-Davidson’s factual claims. 
Second, its rests solely on SunFrog’s lawyers’ statements in prior legal briefs. See 
id.; see supra note 4. Perhaps SunFrog could have cited the affidavit of its corporate 
counsel on these matters, see (Docket #52), but it did not do so. 
 6SunFrog asserts that it does not “take title” to the goods it creates, (Docket 
#57 ¶ 12), but it does not explain what it means. Not only is this a legal conclusion, 
inappropriate for a statement of facts, it is also ludicrous—SunFrog owns the raw 
material and the printers and takes the majority of the revenue from product sales. 
It is, therefore, not analogous to a mere broker, rather than a direct seller, as will 
be explained further below. See infra Part 3.2.1.2; GMA Accessories, Inc. v. BOP, LLC, 
765 F. Supp. 2d 457, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
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offered for sale with just a few keystrokes. SunFrog’s searchable database, 
moreover, made it easy for sellers to locate such designs, as they were 
instantly accessible by searching for the H-D Marks of interest. 
According to SunFrog’s published compensation schedule in effect 
when this lawsuit was filed and during the majority of this case, sellers 
receive 40% of the retail sales price for the products they sell, and an extra 
5.5% if they also created and uploaded the design—i.e., they were the 
“artist” for the design. SunFrog earns the majority, 54.5%, of the retail sales 
price of products sold on its website. SunFrog’s products bearing H-D 
Marks typically sell for about $23–$37 for t-shirts, $43–$53 for hoodies, $18–
$20 for hats, and $18–$24 for mugs. 
SunFrog’s user agreement in effect during the relevant period allows 
it to terminate the accounts of repeat infringers of another’s intellectual 
property. However, the contract permits SunFrog to fulfill orders for 
infringing products even after a takedown notice is received. The contract 
also allows it to keep sellers’ commissions for sales of products that were 
the subject of takedown notices. The agreement permits, but does not 
require, SunFrog to forward those commissions to a charity of its choosing. 
See (Docket #11 ¶¶ 19–20).  
SunFrog has long touted Facebook as a powerful marketing tool to 
advertise its products. SunFrog facilitates the advertisement of products on 
its website on social media sites, including Facebook, by providing its 
sellers with sales tracking tools and offering tutorials for social media 
marketing. For instance, SunFrog has offered Facebook marketing advice 
on a blog on its website since as early as 2015. It also has a dedicated 
Facebook page it created for its sellers. Further, SunFrog’s “SunFrog 
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Academy” has taught its sellers how to use Facebook for marketing since 
as early as January 2017. 
Because of SunFrog’s focus on Facebook as its primary means to 
promote and sell products on its website, Facebook advertising is the source 
of the vast majority of SunFrog’s sales. For example, in a June 16, 2017 
interview with Payoneer, SunFrog’s Affiliate Support official Tyler 
Deerfield stated, “at least 75% of SunFrog sales come from Facebook ad 
referrals. The Facebook ads platform pairs perfectly with SunFrog print 
technology.” (Docket #48 ¶ 11). The interview continues, “While artists and 
sellers can have some luck posting organically (without ads), it’s unlikely 
to have a high degree of success without targeting.” Id. 
More recently, in an interview with Entrepreneur on August 2, 2017, 
SunFrog’s founder and CEO Josh Kent (“Kent”) stated, “Nothing touches 
Facebook ads. . . . I’m telling you right now, nothing compares to Facebook 
ads. Focus your energy in on that. . .[,] that’s our secret sauce. . . . 95% of 
our sales, they’re are coming through Facebook. Facebook is a force” and 
“[SunFrog] even [has] an academy. . .[where] we’re going to show you how 
to set up [a] [Facebook] ad [and] target. . . .” Id. ¶ 8.  
Facebook ads that feature SunFrog products bearing H-D Marks 
attract wide exposure. For example, five separate Facebook ads for five 
different products bearing H-D Marks had a combined total of more than 
116,000 reactions (e.g., “likes”), more than 3,300 comments, and more than 
31,000 shares. The ad for one such product had received 3,800 reactions, had 
been shared 634 times, and had 60 comments as of July 2, 2017, four days 
after it was posted on June 29. As of July 13, 2017, the total reactions or likes 
increased from 3,800 to 6,100, the number of times the link was shared 
increased from 634 to 1,079, and the number of comments increased from 
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60 to 118. The advertisement still had a direct link as of July 13, 2017 to the 
sales page for the product on SunFrog’s website.  
2.3 SunFrog’s Commercial Success 
SunFrog’s business has been highly successful. Regarding revenues, 
in his interview with Entrepreneur on August 2, 2017, Kent stated that 
“[w]e launched this website and in our first year we did about a million 
dollars. In our second year, we did just shy of $100 million. We had some 
incredibly explosive growth.” (Docket #48 ¶ 8). Further, according to a July 
9, 2017 Crain’s Detroit Business article based on an interview with Kent, 
SunFrog’s projected sales are “up to $150 million [in 2017]”; SunFrog’s sales 
were “$100 million [in 2016]”; and “SunFrog is now the largest maker of 
printed t-shirts in the U.S.” Id. ¶ 9. A June 30, 2017 Forbes article stated that 
“SunFrog is a three-year-old company with revenue of more than 100 
million per year.” Id. ¶ 10.7 
Regarding unit sales, in a June 7, 2017 interview with Crain’s, Kent 
stated, “Our initial goal was to sell 100 shirts a day, and if we could do that 
then we could be in a position to focus on it more. That 100 shirts a day 
quickly became 10,000 a day and kept going. It was bigger than I had 
planned or hoped for.” Id. ¶ 12. In a July 11, 2016 interview with MyNorth, 
Kent said, “Our goal was to make 100 shirts a day. Now sometimes we’re 
up to 20,000 shirts a day. We want SunFrog to be to t-shirts what Amazon 
was (originally) to books.” Id. ¶ 13. 
																																																						
 7Not to belabor SunFrog’s half-hearted attempts at disputing the facts, but 
SunFrog’s entire response to this paragraph of information is the sentence, 
“SunFrog is not a t-shirt maker, it is a service provider,” (Docket #51 ¶ 51), bereft 
of citation to any evidence at all. The same goes for the next paragraph. Id. ¶ 52. 
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Regarding website traffic, SunFrog’s website was popular and 
highly trafficked during the period relevant to this suit. In the interview 
with Entrepreneur on August 2, 2017, Kent reported that “within just a few 
short years we [have] become one of the world’s highest trafficked sites. I 
think we hit about two something, 200 or 300 on the Alexa ranking. . . . We 
passed Nike, Under Armor, Victoria’s Secret, sky rocket up. . . . We live in 
a day and time where you can build a dream and you can compete head to 
head, like we do. . .with brick and mortar J.C. Penney’s and these other 
companies and you can do it in almost no time at all and you can do it 
leveraging social media.” Id. ¶ 8. Although its estimates vary, SunFrog often 
claims that its website is among the top 500 most popular websites in the 
United States and in the top 2,000 in the world.  
2.4 The Infringing Products  
Harley-Davidson has identified twelve different types of products 
sold by SunFrog that bear designs that infringe its trademarks, including 
ladies’ t-shirts, men’s’ t-shirts, youth t-shirts, ladies’ V-neck t-shirts, men’s’ 
V-neck t-shirts, long-sleeve shirts, tank tops, sweatshirts, hoodies, leggings, 
mugs, and hats. SunFrog lists each of these twelve types of goods separately 
on pages and drop-down menus in its website. Not every H-D Mark 
appeared on every type of good, although the majority did. See (Docket #51 
¶ 55). Further, Harley-Davidson’s infringement analysis, reflected in 
voluminous charts appended to its submissions, shows only one particular 
infringing design used on each of the twelve types of products. However, 
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most of the product types have been offered with multiple, distinct 
infringing designs, many of which bear two or more H-D Marks.8 
In March and April of 2017 alone, SunFrog’s website featured more 
than 100 different infringing designs on thousands of products. That 
represents more than 1,325 different individual counterfeit products and 
more than 2,575 unauthorized uses of the H-D Marks.	 Of course, as 
SunFrog’s corporate counsel notes, the designs appearing on the website do 
not translate into products unless someone actually orders a product. 
According to counsel, the vast majority of mockups never result in a single 
sale.9 
None of these products were subject to Harley-Davidson’s quality 
control standards and procedures. In addition, a number of them would not 
have been approved as licensed products because they violate Harley-
Davidson’s guidelines for objectionable content, including the inclusion of 
religious symbols, vulgar, crude, or offensive language, satanic or 
																																																						
8At many points, SunFrog disputes the notion that it is a purveyor of 
counterfeit goods. See (Docket #55 ¶ 56). But in only one instance does SunFrog 
explain that its “user-generated designs [] differ too greatly from Plaintiffs’ 
licensed apparel to be counterfeits.” Id. SunFrog cites no evidence for this 
proposition. In any event, it is more properly a legal argument than a factual one, 
and it is addressed below. See infra Part 3.2.1.1. 
 9SunFrog wants to strike Harley-Davidson’s infringement analyses for the 
reason that they are based on “nothing but their own self serving, conclusory 
declarations.” (Docket #51 ¶¶ 58–68). As with most of SunFrog’s factual disputes, 
this one is entirely without merit. Courts do not dispense with sworn statements 
on summary judgment merely because they are self-serving or conclusory; those 
are matters for the trier of fact to consider when evaluating the credibility of the 
statements. The Seventh Circuit has emphasized this point for over a decade. Hill 
v. Tangherlini, 724 F.3d 965, 967 (7th Cir. 2013); McKinney v. Office of Sheriff of 
Whitley Cnty., 866 F.3d 803, 814 (7th Cir. 2017). Provided that the statements meet 
the other requirements of admissibility, such as personal knowledge, they can be 
considered. Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 773 (7th Cir. 2003). 
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excessively violent depictions of skulls, and the word “gun.” Other 
products display the text “Harley-Davidson Motor Company,” which 
Harley-Davidson only uses for corporate purposes and would not approve 
for use on licensed products. Still others display H-D Marks in modified or 
mutilated form, as would not be permitted in licensed products. 
Harley-Davidson obtained several infringing products through test 
purchases or as a result of seizures by government officials. In each case, 
products were shipped from SunFrog’s factory in Gaylord, Michigan. 
Several of the products have a printed neck label or other label with the 
SunFrog trademark on it, which Harley-Davidson suggests shows a co-
branding or licensing relationship between SunFrog and Harley-Davidson 
where none exists. SunFrog denies such a relationship exists, too, and that 
any such suggestion arises from the labels. 
2.5 Harley-Davidson’s Takedown Notices and SunFrog’s  
  Response 
Since October 2016, SunFrog marketed, promoted, advertised, and 
sold products bearing H-D Marks—primarily apparel—on its website. 
Harley-Davidson placed SunFrog on notice of its trademark rights by 
submitting at least seventy objections, starting in October 2016 and 
continuing to May 2017, encompassing well over 800 items. SunFrog 
responded by removing the challenged designs.10 Yet infringement 
continued, as new infringing designs would rapidly replace those that had 
been removed, and all the while SunFrog continued to market, promote, 
																																																						
 10Harley-Davidson views the takedowns as SunFrog’s concession that 
infringement was occurring, but SunFrog says that it acquiesced in takedown 
requests without determining whether the challenged designs were in fact 
infringing. 
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advertise, and sell such products on its website. For a significant period of 
time, SunFrog’s conduct showed that it expected it would have to do no 
more than respond to takedown notices in order to adequately address the 
intellectual property rights of third parties.  
Despite Harley-Davidson providing SunFrog with a link to each 
accused product on the website, SunFrog typically took at least two days 
and as long as seven days to deactivate the product listing. For example, of 
the 548 products for which Harley-Davidson submitted takedown 
complaints that were the subject of the declaration of Abel Low, a Harley-
Davidson Brand Protection Manager, (Docket #10), SunFrog took three or 
more days to remove 78% of those products and 4–7 days for 35% of them.  
In addition to the time it took SunFrog to remove products identified 
by Harley-Davidson in its takedown notices, SunFrog continued to display 
many of the products even after they were “removed.” SunFrog continued 
to display such products in search results on its website. Further, it 
continued to use image URLs, product URLs, and sales-tracking URLs for 
“removed” products to drive traffic to its website. SunFrog’s URLs are 
widely distributed on social media and other websites, and persons clicking 
on those URLs for a “removed” product would be linked to SunFrog’s 
website and receive either a page advertising other SunFrog products or a 
message inviting the consumer to “start over” and conduct a search for 
products. In some cases, when a user would encounter an infringing 
product in a search result page and click on it, he would be redirected to a 
page selling a non-infringing product. SunFrog’s removal of the sales pages 
of some infringing products during March and April 2017 did not stop 
SunFrog or its sellers from advertising and offering new infringing 
products bearing identical H-D Marks or even identical infringing designs 
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that SunFrog earlier acknowledged and “removed” in its responses to H-
D’s prior complaints. 
Despite Harley-Davidson’s numerous and repeated complaints, 
SunFrog continued up to the filing of this lawsuit on May 19, 2017 (and 
beyond) to advertise, offer for sale, and sell numerous infringing products. 
First, SunFrog continued to advertise and sell numerous infringing 
products in April and May 2017 bearing the identical H-D Marks cited in 
Harley-Davidson’s prior takedown complaints in March and April of that 
year. Second, SunFrog continued to allow the same anonymous sellers that 
were repeat infringers of the H-D Marks and identified in Harley-
Davidson’s prior takedown complaints—such as “BW999” and 
“Bomman”—to offer and sell hundreds of infringing products.  
Third, SunFrog continued to advertise and sell infringing products 
bearing designs identical to those identified in Harley-Davidson’s prior 
takedown complaints. On March 31, 2017, Harley-Davidson objected to 
many such products, including three that SunFrog stated it had “removed” 
in response to the takedown complaints. Shortly after these “removals,” 
dozens of new infringing products bearing these same three designs were 
posted on the website and were still available for purchase as of May 15, 
2017. 
Finally, when Harley-Davidson first submitted takedown 
complaints to SunFrog in October 2016, SunFrog’s products consisted of 
apparel for adults. SunFrog later expanded its offerings to include leggings 
(November 2016), youth t-shirts (January 2017), and mugs (February 2017). 
Despite Harley-Davidson’s objections to hundreds of other infringing 
products, many designs within these new types of products soon bore H-D 
Marks that were the subject of the earlier takedown complaints. 
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SunFrog counters by noting the volume of user-generated designs 
and takedown notices. At its peak, SunFrog had roughly 150,000 user-
generated designs uploaded to its website every day. Further, “during a 
relatively brief period, Plaintiffs’ [sic] submitted at least [810] takedown 
requests that SunFrog responded to by removing the allegedly infringing 
designs.” (Docket #51 ¶¶ 77–81). SunFrog believes its practices with respect 
to its notice and takedown tool are in accord with industry norms, and as 
will be detailed below, it has continued to develop new anti-piracy tools. 
See infra Part 2.7. 
2.6 The Infringement Continues  
Harley-Davidson filed this action on May 19, 2017. (Docket #1). The 
complaint recites claims for: (1) trademark counterfeiting under 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1114(1); (2) trademark infringement under 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1); (3) 
trademark infringement, false designation of origin, and unfair competition 
under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A); (4) trademark dilution under 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1125(c); (5) copyright infringement under 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq.; (6) 
trademark infringement under Wis. Stat. § 132 et seq.; and (7) common law 
trademark infringement, unfair competition, and misappropriation. Id. at 
38–45. 
Shortly after it filed the complaint, on May 30, 2017, Harley-
Davidson moved for a preliminary injunction. (Docket #5). On June 21, 
2017, SunFrog filed a brief in opposition, claiming it had implemented 
“non-monetary relief” that “fully resolve[d]” Harley-Davidson’s concerns 
and that the motion was moot because SunFrog was: (1) no longer using or 
displaying any of the H-D Marks on its website; (2) no longer using or 
displaying any images with the H-D Marks on its website (i.e., no infringing 
designs or products); (3) no longer selling infringing products after 
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removal; and (4) no longer allowing repeat infringers to sell any infringing 
products. See (Docket #16). 
Despite these representations, infringement continued. First, 
SunFrog continued to advertise and offer to sell numerous infringing 
products bearing the same H-D Marks cited in Harley-Davidson’s prior 
takedown notices, and SunFrog continued to display numerous infringing 
designs on its website which Harley-Davidson had identified in its motion. 
The motion identified 115 different infringing designs available during May 
2017, and 93 of those were still available on June 22, 2017. More than 40 of 
these 93 designs displayed one of the H-D Marks in the product title or 
description.  
Second, SunFrog continued to allow some of the same prolific sellers 
to continue selling infringing products. Third, SunFrog advertised and 
offered for sale infringing products created before and after May 30, 2017. 
Fourth, SunFrog expanded the types of products it offered from shirts, 
leggings, and mugs bearing the H-D Marks to also include hats. Fifth, 
SunFrog continued to include infringing products in search results on its 
website. Searches on the site on July 3, 2017 for HARLEY-DAVIDSON, HD, 
H-D, and FATBOY continued to return results for infringing products 
bearing those marks. Sixth, SunFrog continued to allow infringing designs 
to be present in the All Art database. Seventh, SunFrog continued to allow 
sellers to create new infringing designs, apply them to blank products, and 
sell them.  
Even after Harley-Davidson’s July 5, 2017 reply brief reported these 
continuing violations, SunFrog persisted. At the scheduling conference on 
July 14, 2017, SunFrog again represented that the motion for preliminary 
injunction was moot because it had resolved all of Harley-Davidson’s 
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concerns. In response, Harley-Davidson provided evidence at that 
conference of SunFrog’s continuing infringement up to the time of the 
conference. See (Docket #24, #25). As in prior submissions, Harley-Davidson 
proffered evidence that SunFrog continued to sell previously identified 
infringing products, allowed the creation of new products using previously 
identified infringing designs, and included infringing products in search 
results. Furthermore, SunFrog continued to use URLs for infringing 
products.  
As the Court observed in its order granting the motion for 
preliminary injunction, “even after SunFrog filed its brief in opposition to 
the motion for preliminary injunction (and even as of the day of the Court’s 
Rule 16 scheduling conference a month later), most of the infringing 
products Harley-Davidson identified initially were still advertised on 
SunFrog’s website and available for sale.” (Docket #33 at 6).11 Even after the 
Court issued that order on July 31, 2017—more than two months after this 
lawsuit was filed—SunFrog continued its infringement. It continued to 
offer and sell new infringing products, continued to allow repeat offenders 
to sell infringing products, including sellers identified in prior takedown 
complaints, continued to display images of infringing products on its 
website, continued to use URLs containing an H-D Mark, continued to offer 
infringing designs in the All Art database, and advertised and sold 
infringing products on Amazon. These constituted violations of the Court’s 
order. Harley-Davidson’s counsel sent SunFrog’s counsel emails on August 
																																																						
 11During the pendency of the motion for preliminary injunction, SunFrog 
filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. (Docket #27). 
That motion was denied in an order dated October 4, 2017. (Docket #40). 
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7, 11, 15, and 18, October 25, and November 15, 2017 documenting in 
exacting detail SunFrog’s violations of that order. It does not appear from 
the record that SunFrog has received any notices of continuing violations 
since November 2017. See (Docket #50 at 13). 
2.7 SunFrog’s Anti-Infringement Efforts 
SunFrog’s in-house counsel, Christopher Carol (“Carol”), provided 
a lengthy affidavit describing the company’s growing pains as they relate 
to anti-infringement efforts. As might be expected, Harley-Davidson 
quarrels with his merciful view of his company’s struggle to cope with 
intellectual property infringement. Those disputes will be discussed further 
below. For present purposes, it will better serve the narrative to set forth his 
averments while largely ignoring Harley-Davidson’s disagreements. That 
said, it is important to appreciate that Carol gives almost no dates for the 
developments he describes, and thus it is difficult to fit his claims within 
the timeline of this case.  
Carol attests that because SunFrog grew rapidly as a company 
during the past three years, it faced “a number of challenges when scaling 
its services.” (Docket #57 ¶¶ 18–20).12 One of SunFrog’s most consistent 
																																																						
 12Harley-Davidson was not immune to the perils of inapposite challenges 
to factual statements. It claims that many of Carol’s sworn statements are not 
statements of fact but are instead “allegation[s] that [are] vague and ambiguous.” 
See, e.g., (Docket #57 ¶¶ 19–22). True, his testimony may not be persuasive to a jury 
because it is vague or hard to corroborate, but at summary judgment Carol’s sworn 
testimony cannot be disregarded for those reasons. However, the Court observes 
that Carol opines on a wide range of topics touching upon marketing, law, and 
computer science. This perhaps stretches the limit of the topics upon which 
corporate counsel can testify, Von der Ruhr, 570 F.3d at 862 (a corporate 
representative may only testify about those matters on which he possesses 
personal knowledge by virtue of his position in the company), but Harley-
Davidson did not make that argument. 
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problems involved “bad actors” uploading and selling designs that 
infringed upon the intellectual property rights of a third party. Id. Although 
SunFrog requires its users to affirmatively check a box that places SunFrog’s 
intellectual property policy within a user’s line of sight and requires him or 
her to agree never to use SunFrog’s services to infringe on another party’s 
intellectual property rights, SunFrog found itself struggling to stay ahead 
of a small minority of “sophisticated bad actors.” Id. 
Because it can be difficult to track users who deliberately obfuscate 
their identities online, SunFrog experimented when it decided to terminate 
a user’s account because he or she had violated SunFrog’s policies. Through 
long trial and error, SunFrog found that the most successful way to ban 
offenders after they were identified is to prohibit new accounts from using 
the same payment information associated with another account.  
SunFrog says that its business model relies on a concept called 
“affiliate marketing,” whereby a user markets designs to others and 
receives a commission for their efforts. Affiliate marketing requires a degree 
of knowledge and sophistication in users and SunFrog provides 
educational materials to its users in effort to improve their experience in 
utilizing this technique. According to SunFrog, “[t]hese are well known[,] 
authentic marketing techniques designed to draw in more users due to the 
customer service and quality of the platform.” Id. ¶ 23. 
As stated previously, at its peak, SunFrog’s users uploaded more 
than 150,000 new designs every day. Given the constancy with which this 
volume of new designs poured onto the various pages on its website, 
SunFrog contends that “it became easy for a small number of bad actors to 
upload and sell mockups made with infringing designs.” Id. ¶ 26. SunFrog 
has worked to develop tools that not only keep pace with the demand 
Case 2:17-cv-00711-JPS   Filed 04/12/18   Page 24 of 81   Document 71
Page 25 of 81 
created by users wanting to design and share mockups, it has worked to 
develop tools to curb intellectual property infringement and give rights 
holders the ability to notify SunFrog of allegedly infringing mockups with 
ease, such as a streamlined notice and takedown procedure, which is an 
industry norm. SunFrog ensured that trained and dedicated employees 
evaluated notifications of allegedly infringing designs and, when 
appropriate, removed those designs as quickly as was practicable. 
As SunFrog continued to grow, it became more difficult to prevent 
even a small number of users from creating constant infringement 
problems. To proactively make SunFrog less attractive for such conduct, 
SunFrog began to implement keyword blocking to prevent designs 
described with words that it had learned over time had a high probability 
of being associated with intellectual property infringement from going live 
on SunFrog’s website in the first place. While keyword blocking was and 
remains a “hugely successful” tool in SunFrog’s arsenal, some repeat 
offenders realized that they could get around the control by hiding 
keywords in the visual designs they uploaded. Id. ¶ 31. 
SunFrog has worked with several rights holders to establish lists of 
keywords used to filter user-generated uploads in real time to prevent 
known infringing material from publishing on the website without 
blocking legitimate content. SunFrog has also provided certain rights 
holders with back-end access to its website to allow them to monitor its anti-
infringement efforts and screen user uploads to flag infringing designs. 
Another tool developed by SunFrog to protect rights holders allows for the 
profits from allegedly infringing items to be diverted from the sellers’ 
accounts into participating rights holders’ accounts. Though often skeptical 
at first, Carol says that most rights holders with which SunFrog has dealt 
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during the past year have been satisfied with the many steps SunFrog has 
taken to combat alleged intellectual property infringement. 
In response to this development and to protect rights holders with 
visual instead of textual trademarks, SunFrog expended a considerable 
amount of time, energy, and money researching potential solutions before 
partnering with a leading provider of OCR technology, which SunFrog now 
uses to screen new designs as users submit them in an attempt to identify 
and prevent the sharing of infringing designs. In addition to automating 
the screening process, SunFrog has implemented training on intellectual 
property issues for a number of its employees in key areas of the business. 
SunFrog does not describe what this training involves in any way. 
Many links to allegedly infringing designs are disabled within hours 
of being reported. SunFrog contends that it has never knowingly allowed 
an infringing design that has been reported to remain available. SunFrog 
also maintains that until a rights holder reports designs as infringing, it 
would have no way of knowing whether the user did or did not own rights 
in that design. As must be clear from the preceding narrative, Harley-
Davidson disagrees, contending that SunFrog’s slow response to takedown 
requests and its allowing repeat infringers to continue infringing 
demonstrate that it was a willing participant in—or at least willfully blind 
to—infringing designs available on its website.  
Despite its investments, SunFrog realized that users who wanted to 
sell infringing products had also gotten more advanced. Frustrated by the 
sheer volume of troublesome submissions and seeking to find a way to 
proactively monitor them, SunFrog began investigating, in November 2017, 
a suspicion that a few parties had learned to use “bots” to automate the 
process of creating and uploading designs, often using existing designs as 
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the building blocks. That same month, SunFrog took steps to prevent bots 
from uploading designs to its website, which reduced the daily number of 
user-generated designs uploaded to SunFrog’s site to roughly 10,000 per 
day. While still daunting, this reduction in the volume of submissions not 
only improved the response time for takedown requests, it also allowed 
SunFrog to temporarily channel the many anti-piracy tools it has developed 
in one direction if SunFrog becomes aware of a more specialized content 
problem. Reducing the amount of submissions also allowed SunFrog to 
develop new tools to monitor uploads and to take action against infringing 
content.  
Currently, SunFrog is focusing specific resources on preventing 
users from sharing designs that may infringe on Harley-Davidson’s 
intellectual property. Two employees monitor keywords in a Harley-
Davidson rights holder account and look for activity on social media 
platforms like Facebook on a daily basis. SunFrog’s customer service 
employees have received training on how to monitor orders for infringing 
products, with instruction to cancel and refund orders containing Harley-
Davidson’s intellectual property and to notify the legal department upon 
finding an infringing design. SunFrog says that it continues to develop new 
anti-infringement tools, though it does not describe what those tools might 
be. 
SunFrog reports that in the past four years, it has terminated 3,394 
accounts. Further, “[s]ince tuning up its hard won anti-infringement 
apparatus and using it to [protect] [Harley-Davidson’s] Intellectual 
Property from third parties who might attempt to upload infringing 
designs to SunFrog’s website, SunFrog has identified a small number of 
accounts abusing [Harley-Davidson’s] Intellectual Property and 
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subsequently terminated 13 accounts.” Id. ¶ 53. It does not report when this 
occurred, though ostensibly it was after the lawsuit was filed. SunFrog also 
has implemented a zero-tolerance policy for accounts attempting to 
infringe upon Harley-Davidson’s rights.  
Further, SunFrog offered Harley-Davidson access to a rights holder 
account in order to monitor and disable designs incorporating its marks 
and “requested a small modicum of cooperation from [Harley-Davidson] 
as to any additional keywords that should be monitored and as to the ways 
and channels in which [Harley-Davidson] was discovering the infringing 
activity.” Id. ¶ 57. Harley-Davidson retorts that SunFrog’s efforts have been 
lacking, noting that it found infringement through quick, easy searches of 
the All Art database, by clicking on links for infringing products that it had 
already disclosed to SunFrog, through searches of Facebook, including 
SunFrog sellers’ Facebook pages that previously advertised infringing 
products, and Google searches using the combinations of the term 
“SunFrog” and the H-D Marks. None of this searching involved extensive 
efforts and none used any special technology. 
Carol believes that SunFrog has attempted to handle all complaints 
from all parties, including Harley-Davidson, in the most expedient and 
effective manner possible. He seems particularly irked that Harley-
Davidson did not communicate at all with SunFrog before filing this 
lawsuit other than through use of SunFrog’s online infringement reporting 
tool.  
3.  ANALYSIS  
 The Court observed last year that this is a fairly straightforward case 
of counterfeiting. (Docket #33 at 3). Nothing about the development of the 
evidence changes the Court’s view. This includes SunFrog’s plea that it is 
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working hard to improve its anti-infringement policies and procedures. 
Genuine as those efforts may be, federal law did not and does not require 
Harley-Davidson to wait and see whether they will bear fruit.  
 Additionally, SunFrog advances many of the same legal defenses 
that the Court considered and rejected in the context of its motion to 
dismiss. Those theories continue to be wholly without merit, as the Court 
shall explain a second time. Ultimately, it seems SunFrog’s business was 
built, at least initially, atop the slender reeds of these legal defenses, not on 
meaningful work to combat infringement. 
 3.1 Failure to Take Discovery 
 One refrain in SunFrog’s submissions that can be quickly disposed 
of at the outset is that summary judgment is improper because “no 
discovery has been taken.” (Docket #50 at 14–15). SunFrog is certainly right 
that many of the questions that arise in trademark cases are fact-intensive. 
SunFrog also seems to be correct that, as of the filing of Harley-Davidson’s 
motion, neither party had sought significant discovery from the other. See 
id. at 15. Earnest discovery efforts appear to have begun only after the 
present motion was fully briefed. See (Docket #66). 
 But why does this matter? Harley-Davidson submitted its own 
evidence in connection with its motion as required by the federal and local 
summary judgment rules, including several lengthy, detailed affidavits and 
many hundreds of pages of documents. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1); Civ. L. 
R. 56(b)(1)(C)–(D); (Docket #46, #47, #48, #49, #54, #55, #56). SunFrog cites 
no rule, case, or other authority suggesting that Harley-Davidson cannot 
rely solely on its own evidence or, conversely, that Harley-Davidson was 
required to seek discovery from SunFrog in order to prove its claims. 
Indeed, conservation of resources would counsel against such efforts, if 
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Harley-Davidson believed that it already possessed all the evidence it 
needed to succeed. See Waterloo Furniture Components, Ltd. v. Haworth, Inc., 
467 F.3d 641, 648 (7th Cir. 2006) (“Rule 56 does not require that discovery 
take place in all cases before summary judgment can be granted. In fact, this 
Court has noted that ‘the fact that discovery is not complete—indeed has 
not begun—need not defeat [a motion for summary judgment].’”) (quoting 
Am. Nurses’ Ass’n v. Illinois, 783 F.2d 716, 729 (7th Cir. 1986)). 
 As every law student can recite, once Harley-Davidson submitted its 
motion and accompanying evidence, the burden then shifted to SunFrog to 
show that the proffered evidence was somehow incorrect or incomplete, 
leaving genuine questions of material fact to be answered at trial by the 
jury. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1); Civ. L. R. 56(b)(2)(B)–(C). It could have done so 
by submitting evidence gathered from its own witnesses or from Harley-
Davidson by way of depositions and discovery requests. It had many 
months in which to gather this evidence—discovery has been open since at 
least July 2017—but chose not to.  
 That failure cannot be laid at Harley-Davidson’s feet. The non-
moving party on summary judgment bears the burden to proffer evidence 
raising genuine disputes for trial. As the Supreme Court explained long ago 
in Anderson,  
[t]he movant has the burden of showing that there is no 
genuine issue of fact, but the [non-movant] is not thereby 
relieved of his own burden of producing in turn evidence that 
would support a jury verdict. Rule 56[(c)] itself provides that 
a party opposing a properly supported motion for summary 
judgment may not rest upon mere allegation or denials of his 
pleading, but must set forth specific facts showing that there 
is a genuine issue for trial.  
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Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. Consistent with this approach, our Court of 
Appeals has “consistently held that summary judgment is ‘not a dress 
rehearsal or practice run; it is the put up or shut up moment in a lawsuit, 
when a party must show what evidence it has that would convince a trier 
of fact to accept its version of the events.’” Steen v. Myers, 486 F.3d 1017, 
1022 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Hammel, 407 F.3d at 859). 
 Moreover, to the extent SunFrog implores that it did not engage in 
discovery because of the now-defunct prospect of settlement, the Court is 
unsympathetic. SunFrog and its counsel well understood the risk that 
taking no discovery would leave it vulnerable to summary adjudication. 
Again, the Anderson Court addressed a similar contention in 1986 when it 
said, “the [non-movant] must present affirmative evidence in order to 
defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment. This is true 
even where the evidence is likely to be within the possession of the 
[movant], as long as the [non-movant] has had a full opportunity to conduct 
discovery.” Id. at 257.  
 Finally, conspicuously absent from SunFrog’s submissions is any 
reference to Rule 56(d), which allows a party to avoid summary judgment 
on the ground that it cannot presently offer the facts necessary to justify its 
opposition. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d). The Rule provides that if the non-moving 
party makes this showing, the court can deny the motion or defer its 
consideration while the non-movant gathers the evidence it needs. Id. But 
proper resort to Rule 56(d) generally requires the non-movant to submit an 
affidavit, normally from counsel, specifying the reasons why additional 
discovery is needed and why it could not have been done sooner. Id. 
SunFrog nowhere cited Rule 56(d), nor did it submit an affidavit in 
conformity with the Rule. Kallal v. CIBA Vision Corp., Inc., 779 F.3d 443, 446 
Case 2:17-cv-00711-JPS   Filed 04/12/18   Page 31 of 81   Document 71
Page 32 of 81 
(7th Cir. 2015) (failure to file Rule 56(d) affidavit “fully justifie[s]” denial of 
relief). 
 And even if the Court forgave the failure to submit the affidavit 
described in the Rule’s text—a choice which is committed to the Court’s 
sound discretion, Woods v. City of Chicago, 234 F.3d 979, 990 (7th Cir. 2000)—
also absent from SunFrog’s brief is a cogent and persuasive explanation as 
to why it has not yet been able to gather the facts it needed to oppose 
Harley-Davidson’s motion. The Seventh Circuit has held that although “[a] 
court may disregard a failure to formally comply with Rule 56[(d)],” the 
opposing party’s request for a continuance must “clearly set[ ] out the 
justification for the continuance.” Pfeil v. Rogers, 757 F.2d 850, 856 (7th Cir. 
1985). “When a party fails to secure discoverable evidence due to his own 
lack of diligence,” the necessary justification is lacking, and “it is not an 
abuse of discretion for the trial court to refuse to grant a continuance to 
obtain such information.” Id. at 857.  
 Standing alone, the parties’ refusal to engage in discovery is no 
reason at all to deny summary judgment. Having set aside that puzzling 
contention, the Court proceeds to the merits of the claims on which Harley-
Davidson seeks judgment as a matter of law. 
 3.2 Liability for Trademark Infringement and Dilution 
 Harley-Davidson seeks only partial summary judgment in the 
present motion. It asks for a finding of liability and a permanent injunction 
on its federal and state trademark claims, which include claims of 
infringement, counterfeiting, false designation of origin, unfair 
competition, and dilution. Additionally, on the counterfeiting claim, 
Harley-Davidson requests an award of statutory damages. Compensatory 
damages as to the other trademark claims are not sought in this motion, nor 
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are judgment or damages sought with respect to Harley-Davidson’s claim 
of copyright infringement. See (Docket #44 at 4 n.1). The Court will address 
the trademark claims below. 
  3.2.1 Infringement, Counterfeiting, Unfair Competition,  
   and False Designation of Origin 
 The Lanham Act prohibits the use of a “reproduction, counterfeit, 
copy, or colorable imitation” of a registered trademark in such a way as “is 
likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.” 15 U.S.C. § 
1114(1). There is a similar prohibition relating to unregistered marks. Id. 
§ 1125(a)(1)(A). That Section prohibits the use of an unregistered mark that 
“is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the 
affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, 
or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or 
commercial activities by another person.” Id. Thus, the test for infringement 
of unregistered or registered trademarks is the same: likelihood of 
confusion. See Smith Fiberglass Prods., Inc. v. Ameron, Inc., 7 F.3d 1327, 1329 
(7th Cir. 1993).  
 For infringement to rise to the level of counterfeiting, the defendant’s 
mark must be “a counterfeit of a mark that is registered on the principal 
register in the United States Patent and Trademark Office for such goods or 
services sold, offered for sale, or distributed and that is in use, whether or 
not the person against whom relief is sought knew such mark was so 
registered.” 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d). A counterfeit is defined as “a spurious 
mark which is identical with, or substantially indistinguishable from, a 
registered mark.” Id. § 1127.  
 Claims for trademark infringement and unfair competition under 
Wisconsin law are governed by the same likelihood-of-confusion test. See 
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Nat’l Football League Props., Inc. v. ProStyle, Inc., 16 F. Supp. 2d 1012, 1014–
15 (E.D. Wis. 1998); Patterson v. TNA Ent’mt, LLC, No. 04-C-0192, 2006 WL 
3091136, at *21 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 27, 2006). Further, claims for trademark 
infringement are identical under Wisconsin statutory and common law, 
Foamation, Inc. v. Wedeward Enters., Inc., 970 F. Supp. 676, 689 (E.D. Wis. 
1997), as are claims for unfair competition, Echo Travel, Inc. v. Travel Assoc., 
Inc., 870 F.2d 1264, 1266 (7th Cir. 1989); Thermal Design, Inc. v. Am. Soc’y of 
Heating Refrigerating & Air-Conditioning Eng’rs, Inc., No. 07-C-765, 2008 WL 
1902010, at *8 (E.D. Wis. Apr. 25, 2008). SunFrog does not dispute the 
congruence of federal and state law on these issues. See (Docket #50 at 32–
33). Thus, the Court’s analysis of infringement, likelihood of confusion, and 
SunFrog’s defenses thereto will be unitary.  
 Before assessing the likelihood of consumer confusion, the first step 
in any trademark case is to determine whether the plaintiff’s trademarks 
are protectable. Packman v. Chicago Tribune Co., 267 F.3d. 628, 638 (7th Cir. 
2001). Here, it is undisputed that Harley-Davidson owns valid and 
protectable trademark rights in each of the H-D Marks. It owns federal 
trademark registrations for each of the H-D Marks, except HD, for 
motorcycles. It also owns federal registrations for the marks 
HARLEYDAVIDSON, HARLEY, HD, H-D, Bar & Shield Logo, Willie G. 
Skull Logo, and Number 1 Logo for apparel; for the marks HARLEY-
DAVIDSON, Bar & Shield Logo, Willie G. Skull Logo, and Number 1 Logo 
for mugs; and for the marks HARLEY-DAVIDSON, H-D, HD, Bar & Shield 
Logo, Willie G. Skull Logo, and Number 1 Logo covering hats. All of these 
registrations except one are “incontestable,” which constitutes conclusive 
evidence of Harley-Davidson’s ownership of and exclusive rights to use 
such marks in commerce for the goods recited in the registration, 15 U.S.C. 
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§ 1115(b), and the other registration is prima facie evidence that the 
registered mark is valid, id. § 1115(a). In addition, Harley-Davidson has 
common law rights in all of the H-D Marks for apparel, mugs, hats, and 
other goods based on its use of those marks in connection with such goods 
for many years. Thus, the protectability of the trademarks is generally not 
at issue, save in a few narrow respects that will be discussed below. 
 The parties’ disputes center on SunFrog’s legal defenses, including 
threshold questions of whether its marks are counterfeit and whether it is 
“using” the marks in the trademark sense. The parties also disagree as to 
whether there is a likelihood of confusion between Harley-Davidson’s and 
SunFrog’s uses of the marks, and whether SunFrog’s business is immune 
from liability because of its anti-infringement policies, procedures, and 
technologies. The Court will address each of these topics in turn. 
Overarching the entire analysis is the principle that while trademark cases 
often raise triable questions of fact, summary judgment is nevertheless 
appropriate “if the evidence is so one-sided that there can be no doubt 
about how the question[s] should be answered.” Door Sys., Inc. v. Pro-Line 
Door Sys., Inc., 83 F.3d 169, 171 (7th Cir. 1996). 
   3.2.1.1 Counterfeiting 
 First, SunFrog claims that this is not a counterfeiting case at all 
because the parties’ products are of substantially different quality and are 
readily distinguishable by consumers. (Docket #50 at 17). In this instance, 
SunFrog turns Harley-Davidson’s stringent quality-control standards 
against it, arguing that genuine, licensed goods have a “uniquely high 
quality,” whereas the goods sold by SunFrog “broadcast an obviously 
amateur style.” Id. Moreover, consumers encountering SunFrog’s products 
online would recognize them as user-generated, not professional quality. 
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Id. at 18. At a minimum, says SunFrog, in light of the vast differences in 
item quality, consumers would not find the marks used on genuine Harley-
Davidson products and its products to be “substantially indistinguishable” 
when viewed in context. Id. Consequently, though this might be a case 
about ordinary trademark infringement, it is not about counterfeiting. See 
id. at 18–19. (This difference is hugely important, as statutory damages are 
only available in counterfeiting cases. See infra Part 3.3.1.) 
 The problem with this argument is that the counterfeiting inquiry is 
not focused primarily on the quality of the goods bearing the subject marks. 
Indeed, most classic cases of counterfeiting involve a famous mark being 
applied to a shoddy product. The more pertinent question is whether the 
marks, not the goods, are substantially identical. Of course, “[w]hen 
attempting to determine if two marks are similar, the comparison should 
be made ‘in light of what happens in the marketplace, [and] not merely by 
looking at the two marks side-by-side.’” Ty, Inc. v. Jones Grp., Inc., 237 F.3d 
891, 898 (7th Cir. 2001) (quoting Meridian Mut. Ins. Co. v. Meridian Ins. Grp., 
Inc., 128 F.3d 1111, 1115 (7th Cir. 1997)). District court decisions from 
outside this Circuit echo this view, noting that the genuine and counterfeit 
goods must be compared as they appear in the marketplace, not in the 
abstract. See, e.g., Audemars Piguet Holding S.A. v. Swiss Watch Int’l, Inc., No. 
12 Civ. 5423(LAP), 2015 WL 150756, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2015); Colgate-
Palmolive Co. v. J.M.D. All-Star Import & Export Inc., 486 F. Supp. 2d 286, 289 
(S.D.N.Y. 2007); GMA Accessories, Inc. v. BOP, LLC, 765 F. Supp. 2d 457, 472 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011). Yet a careful reading of those opinions reveals that 
although the products themselves are part of the comparison, the central 
focus is on the appearance of the marks in the context of the products.  
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 In any event, the idea that the products themselves need to be 
compared does not help SunFrog much. SunFrog offers no specifics on how 
their products or marks differ from Harley-Davidson’s licensed offerings 
provided in the record. It rests instead on generalizations about product 
quality and auguries about what prospective buyers will think when seeing 
the goods in the marketplace. This is not what summary judgment should 
look like, and the Court will not scour the record for evidence and argument 
helpful to SunFrog. See Anderson v. Hardman, 241 F.3d 544, 545–46 (7th Cir. 
2001); Stransky v. Cummins Engine Co., Inc., 51 F.3d 1329, 1335 (7th Cir. 1995) 
(“The federal courts will not invent legal arguments for litigants.”). 
 Despite SunFrog’s failure to do more than gesture at the idea that its 
goods are not counterfeits, the Court undertook the task of reviewing each 
mark against each alleged infringing product. See (Docket #49-1). There is 
no doubt in the mind of the Court that this is a counterfeiting case. In nearly 
every instance, though font sizes, colors, sizes, and shapes are altered, the 
words “Harley-Davidson” or another of its word-marks appear, either 
alone or alongside a logo like the Bar & Shield, Willie G. Skull, or Number 
1 logos. While technically different in some respects, SunFrog’s uses of the 
marks are substantially indistinguishable from the registered marks in 
terms of their appearance in context. If some are more obvious knockoffs 
than others, again, SunFrog has not taken the opportunity to examine them 
in any detail. 
 And the fact remains that a counterfeiter cannot escape liability 
simply by reproducing protected marks on poor products. This would 
create perverse incentives for infringers and leave Harley-Davidson 
without the power to police the use of its marks in many instances. 
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Rejecting an identical argument, the court in Coach, Inc. v. Treasure Box, Inc., 
No. 3:11 CV 468, 2013 WL 2402922 (N.D. Ind. May 31, 2013), explained: 
it simply cannot be the case that an admitted purveyor of 
knockoff goods who intended to profit from their sale can 
claim that it did not intend to infringe merely because the 
goods it offered were of such terrible quality that no one could 
possibly think they were the real thing. Rather, an intent to 
“exploit consumers’ associations with” the genuine article, or 
to profit from the goodwill associated with holder of the 
trademark, is sufficient. 
Id. at *4. 
 When viewed in their commercial context, there can be no mistake 
that SunFrog’s use of the H-D Marks is an effort to pass off SunFrog’s goods 
as genuine, licensed Harley-Davidson products. Conversely, courts are 
hesitant to find counterfeiting where the infringer is not trying to pass off 
his products as another’s, such as when the parties’ products are very 
different. Audemars helps make the point. Audemars Piguet, 2015 WL 150756, 
at *2. There, two watch manufacturers were involved in a trademark 
dispute arising from a particular type of bezel employed on a watch face. 
Id. The court found that the similarities between the subject watches were 
not enough to rise to the level of counterfeiting. Id. One key difference was 
that each watch bore the name of the manufacturer. Id. Thus, it was clear 
that the defendant was not trying to pass off its goods as those of the 
plaintiff. Id. Instead, at worst his product was confusingly similar. Id. Put 
differently, each company was trying to be its own brand but in so doing 
adopted similar product designs or features. Id.  
 Here, by contrast, only one conclusion can be drawn from viewing 
Harley-Davidson’s products against SunFrog’s: SunFrog is trying to dupe 
consumers into thinking that they are buying a genuine licensed article 
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when they are not. Like the store in Coach that sold knockoff Coach bags, 
here it is “clear that the Defendants were looking to capitalize on the 
[Harley-Davidson] name and the demand for [Harley-Davidson] 
products—and the esteem that they hold in the marketplace—in selling the 
knockoff [Harley Davidson] items.” Coach, 2013 WL 2402922, at *4. 
 Nor does it matter, as SunFrog seems to believe, that purchasers go 
to SunFrog’s website to purchase these goods. (Docket #50 at 18–19). 
SunFrog attributes a great deal of savvy to the users of its website, 
contending that they all know that SunFrog sells only user-generated 
designs that are obviously unlicensed. Id. For genuine Harley-Davidson 
goods, SunFrog says, a buyer would know to go to Walmart.com or some 
other licensed dealer. Id.  
 The Court is not convinced. First, the only evidence SunFrog offers 
to support its beliefs as to what its consumers know is the affidavit of its 
corporate counsel. See id.; (Docket #52 ¶ 60). He may have personal 
knowledge of many aspects of SunFrog’s business model and practices, but 
how he knows the minds of SunFrog website users, he does not say. Second, 
SunFrog’s argument cuts as easily against it as it does in its favor. How is 
the average consumer to know that Walmart offers licensed Harley-
Davidson goods but SunFrog does not? Could SunFrog not have bought a 
license to use Harley-Davidson’s trademarks? It has done so for other major 
brands like Marvel and Disney. (Docket #50 at 30).  
 Finally, SunFrog ignores the longstanding principle that trademark 
law protects against confusion both at the point of sale and in the post-sale 
context. CAE, Inc. v. Clean Air Eng’g, 267 F.3d 660, 683 (7th Cir. 2001). Thus, 
even if one buys SunFrog’s claim that the consumer who purchases a 
Harley-Davidson shirt on SunFrog’s website knows that it is a knockoff, 
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other potential consumers of Harley-Davidson products who see him 
wearing that shirt would have no reason to suspect a fake, and seeing a 
cheaply made product may put them off from future purchases of genuine 
Harley-Davidson goods. The Lanham Act proscribes this latter form of 
confusion to the same extent as the former. Id. In the end, SunFrog’s self-
deprecation does nothing but distract from the unavoidable conclusion that 
this is a counterfeiting case. 
   3.2.1.2 Use in Commerce and Ornamental Use 
Next, SunFrog tries to divert liability from itself to its users by 
contending that it does not itself “use” the marks in commerce, nor does it 
use them as trademarks. (Docket #50 at 19–23). On the first point, there is 
little need for extended discussion. In SunFrog’s view, it has never used any 
of Harley-Davidson’s marks, whether placing them on products or in 
advertising; instead, only its users do so. Hence, SunFrog hides behind the 
“user-generated” nature of its products, the automation of its printers, and 
its anti-infringement tools. See (Docket #57 ¶ 48). Yet SunFrog maintains the 
All Art database, advertises infringing designs and trains and encourages 
others to do so, owns and runs its automated printers that print the 
infringing designs onto physical goods, handles products after they come 
off of the printers, bags and ships those products, and processes payment. 
This is use in commerce. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (“use in commerce” requires that 
the mark be “placed in any manner on the goods or their containers or the 
displays associated therewith or on the tags or labels affixed thereto” and 
that the goods “are sold or transported in interstate commerce”). 
 The second point—that SunFrog makes mere “ornamental” use, not 
trademark use, of the marks—is equally misguided. The notion that a logo, 
word, or other designation needs to be used as a trademark “is not a 
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necessary element of a trademark infringement claim.” Univ. Healthsystem 
Consortium v. UnitedHealth Grp., Inc., 68 F. Supp. 3d 917, 926 (N.D. Ill. 2014). 
However, if a designation is being used in a non-trademark fashion, 
“likelihood of confusion is highly unlikely.” 1 McCarthy on Trademarks & 
Unfair Competition (“McCarthy”) § 3:3 (5th ed. 2018). Put another way, 
“‘trademark use’ is not a separate element of plaintiff’s case, but is only one 
aspect of the likelihood of confusion requirement for infringement.” 4 
McCarthy § 23:11.50.  
 It is undeniable that SunFrog made a “trademark” use of the H-D 
Marks. SunFrog vigorously advertised and offered for sale goods bearing 
those marks. Upon request, it printed and shipped them to buyers. It kept 
most of the revenue. SunFrog used the H-D Marks to (falsely) identify its 
goods as coming from or being licensed by Harley-Davidson and to 
distinguish those goods from others’. This is use of the H-D Marks as 
trademarks. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (defining “trademark” as a designation 
used “to identify and distinguish [the user’s] goods. . .from those 
manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods”); 
Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 900 (9th Cir. 2002) (a 
trademark is “a word, phrase or symbol that is used to identify a 
manufacturer or sponsor of a good or the provider of a service”).  
 True, the website users actually craft the designs that incorporate the 
marks. (Docket #50 at 20). But this does not matter, as SunFrog’s 
involvement standing alone constitutes use of the marks. Using a mark 
involves placing it “in any manner” on the goods in question or displays 
associated with them, 15 U.S.C. § 1127, and undoubtedly Harley-
Davidson’s marks were not maintained in the All Art database without 
SunFrog’s effort, did not get onto SunFrog’s goods without the use of 
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SunFrog’s own printers, nor did they make it to purchasers without being 
shipped by SunFrog.  
 Thus, SunFrog is actively involved in the infringing conduct. This 
makes it unlike the fashion showroom in GMA Accessories, on which it 
principally relies. There, the showroom merely housed finished goods 
bearing the plaintiff’s mark; it did not manufacture the goods, label them 
with that mark, or actively try to sell them. GMA Accessories, 765 F. Supp. 
2d at 461. SunFrog, of course, not only advertises and offers infringing 
designs for sale and prints them onto products, it also ships the finished 
products and handles payment processing. Unlike the showroom, SunFrog 
exerts control over nearly every aspect of the advertising, sale, and 
manufacture of the infringing goods, save designing the mockups. By any 
measure, then, SunFrog uses the H-D Marks.13 
 Similarly, it is beside the point that SunFrog puts its own mark on 
the hangtags and labels of its goods. Id. Use of innocuous marks alongside 
infringing ones is not a recognized defense under the Lanham Act. Indeed, 
this circumstance arises often when a licensee puts its own mark on goods 
that also bear a licensed mark. There is no reason to believe that consumers, 
looking at a SunFrog shirt bearing both its mark on the hangtag and an H-
D Mark across the breast, would conclude that SunFrog did not intend to 
signify source, sponsorship, or affiliation by the use of the H-D Mark. The 
																																																						
 13For this reason, SunFrog’s separate defense to the false designation of 
origin claim—that it does not “affix, apply, or annex any false designations of 
origin” onto the goods in question—is without merit. (Docket #50 at 33); 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1125(a). The false designation of origin claim will not be discussed further herein, 
as the parties seem to agree that the relevant inquiry is largely identical to the 
standard infringement analysis. See (Docket #44 at 6–9); (Docket #50 at 33). It will, 
therefore, be subsumed into the existing discussion. 
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opposite inference is far more likely. Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats 
Co., 978 F.2d 947, 954 (7th Cir. 1992) (“[T]he conjunction of defendant’s 
trademark and the allegedly infringed term ‘may actually increase the 
misappropriation by linking defendant’s name to plaintiff’s goodwill.’”); 
Int’l Kennel Club of Chicago, Inc. v. Mighty Start, Inc., 846 F.2d 1079, 1088 (7th 
Cir. 1988) (the defendant’s use of its house mark in conjunction with the 
plaintiff’s mark “is a smoke screen and a poor excuse for the defendants’ 
blatant misappropriation of the plaintiff’s name, for even if fanciers of 
purebred dogs or stuffed toys attached any meaning to the defendants’ 
house mark, they would necessarily believe that the International Kennel 
Club had licensed, approved or otherwise authorized the defendants’ use 
of the International Kennel Club name”). 
 Finally, the idea that mere “ornamental” use of a designation is not 
trademark use has no application here. This doctrine comes into play when, 
for instance, a clothing item bears a slogan or message, such as a hat 
emblazoned with the phrase “Swallow Your Leader.” In re Power Play Int’l, 
Serial No. 75/431,077, 2003 WL 1695913, at *2 (T.T.A.B. Mar. 26, 2003). The 
question becomes whether the slogan, used in this way, “indicat[es] the 
source of the clothing on which it appears.” Id.; 1 McCarthy § 7:24. 
 Suggesting that this doctrine protects it here, SunFrog relies 
primarily on Tovey v. Nike, Inc., No. 1:12CV448, 2014 WL 3510975 (N.D. 
Ohio July 10, 2014). There, the plaintiff owned a registration for the mark 
BOOM YO! for use on apparel. Id. at *4. Later, Nike developed an 
advertising campaign prominently featuring the word “boom.” Id. at *5. 
The plaintiff sued for trademark infringement. Id.  
 In addressing Nike’s argument that the asserted mark was merely 
ornamental, the court noted that a designation can be both ornamental and 
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source-identifying. Id. at *8. However, the plaintiff’s use of the phrase was 
confined to the former purpose. Id. at *9. He never displayed the phrase in 
a consistent font, size, design, color, or location on the goods, nor did he 
designate the phrase as a trademark. Id. Moreover, he did not place the 
phrase on the hang tags or labels for his goods. Id. Thus, the court found 
that he had not used the phrase in a trademark sense, despite the 
presumption that it was a valid trademark by virtue of its registration. Id. 
 All this may sound helpful to SunFrog, but it fails to apply these 
general principles to the case at hand. Specifically, SunFrog does not show 
which of the H-D Marks it claims to have used in a purely ornamental 
fashion. Without doubt, the majority of Harley-Davidson’s word-marks are 
source indicators—they have the company’s name in them. Maybe SunFrog 
is claiming that one or more of Harley-Davidson’s logos are susceptible to 
challenge under the reasoning of Tovey? The Court might surmise, for 
instance, that SunFrog does not think the presence of a skull or the number 
“1” on a t-shirt, standing alone, signifies Harley-Davidson as the source or 
sponsor of the clothing. But the Court is not in the business of teasing out 
nuanced analyses from paltry offerings. It will not review the asserted 
marks against the infringing products to decide what SunFrog should have 
or meant to say. See Anderson, 241 F.3d at 545–46; Stransky, 51 F.3d at 1335. 
 This failure on SunFrog’s part also distinguishes the present case 
from Tovey. There, the court took pains to note that registered trademarks 
are presumptively valid. Id. at *8. But on the particular facts of that case, 
including detailed evidence about the history and usage of the BOOM YO! 
phrase, the court was obliged to conclude that the presumption of validity 
had been rebutted. Id. at *9. SunFrog’s evidence comes nowhere close to 
that marshalled in Tovey; indeed, SunFrog does not bother to discuss even 
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a single mark with any specificity. For that reason, the Court finds SunFrog 
cannot rely on the ornamental-use doctrine. 
   3.2.1.3 Likelihood of Confusion 
 The Court next turns to the heart of any trademark case: the 
likelihood of confusion. Counterfeiting creates a presumption of a 
likelihood of confusion because the defendant’s products are likely to 
confuse consumers when the marks on those products are identical to or 
closely resemble the plaintiff’s marks. See Microsoft Corp. v. Rechanik, 249 F. 
App’x 476, 479 (7th Cir. 2007); Polo Fashions, Inc. v. Craftex, Inc., 816 F.2d 145, 
148 (4th Cir. 1987); Coach, 2013 WL 2402922, at *4 (collecting cases). A 
presumption of confusion in counterfeiting cases is “entirely sensible[,] 
since the only reason people sell counterfeit merchandise is to piggyback 
on a designer item’s popularity and then profit from it in the process.” 
Coach, 2013 WL 2402922, at *4. 
 SunFrog asserts that there remain genuine issues of material fact as 
to the likelihood of confusion. (Docket #50 at 23–27). This argument seems 
to rest on the incorrect assumption that this is not a counterfeiting case and 
that a likelihood of confusion is therefore not presumed. Of course, the 
presumption of confusion is rebuttable, see Coach, 2013 WL 2402922, at *5, 
so the Court will consider whether SunFrog’s proffered evidence 
overcomes it. 
 The Seventh Circuit considers the following factors to determine 
whether consumers are likely to be confused: (1) the similarity between the 
marks in appearance and suggestion; (2) the similarity of the products; (3) 
the area and manner of concurrent use; (4) the degree and care likely to be 
exercised by consumers; (5) the strength of the plaintiff’s mark; (6) any 
actual confusion; and (7) the intent of the defendant to “palm off” his 
Case 2:17-cv-00711-JPS   Filed 04/12/18   Page 45 of 81   Document 71
Page 46 of 81 
product as that of the plaintiffs. Ty, 237 F.3d at 897. No single factor is 
dispositive, “although, in many cases, the similarity of the marks, the 
defendant’s intent, and actual confusion are particularly important.” 
Packman, 267 F.3d at 643. The likelihood-of-confusion test has been 
characterized as “equitable,” meaning that courts may assign varying 
weights to each factor as the facts demand it. Barbecue Marx, Inc. v. 551 
Ogden, Inc., 235 F.3d 1041, 1044 (7th Cir. 2000). While the existence of a 
likelihood of confusion is generally a question of fact, it can be resolved on 
summary judgment where, considering all seven factors collectively, no 
reasonable jury could find in the non-movant’s favor. See Sorenson v. WD-
40 Co., 792 F.3d 712, 732 (7th Cir. 2015); AutoZone, Inc. v. Strick, 543 F.3d 923, 
929 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 Harley-Davidson contends that all seven factors strongly favor it, 
since: (1) the parties’ marks are identical or materially indistinguishable; (2) 
the parties offer identical products; (3) both parties sell such products to the 
general public, including online; (4) ordinary and perhaps even 
sophisticated consumers cannot distinguish the identically-branded 
products; (5) the H-D Marks are strong and famous; (6) “actual confusion 
is presumed where the marks and products are identical”; and (7) 
SunFrog’s intent to palm off their own products as Harley-Davidson’s is 
clear based on its counterfeiting of the H-D Marks. (Docket #44 at 9); Third 
Educ. Grp., Inc. v. Phelps, 675 F. Supp. 2d 916, 924 (E.D. Wis. 2009) (likelihood 
of confusion is “self-evident” where the marks and products are identical 
or nearly so). The Court largely agrees with this assessment and finds that 
SunFrog’s arguments to the contrary are unavailing.  
 In discussing several of the factors, SunFrog reiterates its belief that 
the lack of factual development in the record means that summary 
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judgment is not appropriate. (Docket #50 at 24–25). As explained above, 
what SunFrog does not do is offer persuasive reasons why this is so, or why 
it could not have taken the needed discovery itself. See supra Part 3.1. With 
that in mind, the Court turns to SunFrog’s substantive arguments on each 
likelihood-of-confusion factor. 
 Strength and Similarity of Marks. First, says SunFrog, the H-D Marks 
are not strong. (Docket #50 at 24, 26). Yet it discusses only the Willie G. Skull 
logo, ignoring the word-marks and other logos. See id. at 24. SunFrog 
complains that “[g]iven the pervasiveness of skull designs in the clothing 
industry, the volume of ill-defined marks asserted against SunFrog, and the 
poor-quality images transmitted to SunFrog in piecemeal correspondence, 
it is impossible to summarize the similarities and differences between the 
marks asserted by Plaintiffs and those Plaintiffs claim are infringing.” Id. It 
cites no legal authority to support this position. Instead, it relies on the fact 
that there exist many registrations for marks incorporating some kind of 
skull design. Id.; (Docket #50-1). 
Certainly, a suggestion that a mark is not distinctive is relevant to 
the present inquiry. Trademarks can be either inherently distinctive as 
source identifiers, or they can claim protection if they have acquired 
distinctiveness (also called “secondary meaning”) through, for instance, 
long and well-known use in connection with a particular type of goods. 2 
McCarthy § 11:2; Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 769 (1992). 
For the Willie G. Skull logo to receive trademark protection, Harley-
Davidson must produce evidence of secondary meaning, as commonplace 
non-word designations generally are not inherently distinctive because 
they do not serve to identify the source of the goods. See Amazing Spaces, 
Inc. v. Metro Mini Storage, 608 F.3d 225, 242 (5th Cir. 2010); Seabrook Foods, 
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Inc. v. Bar-Well Foods Ltd., 568 F.2d 1342, 1344 (C.C.P.A. 1977). But Harley-
Davidson has surely met that burden here, given the extensive evidence 
regarding the registration of the Willie G. Skull logo, its long-standing use 
with Harley-Davidson products, and its well-known status as an iconic 
Harley-Davidson symbol. CAE, 267 F.3d at 681 (courts may assess strength 
based on length of use of a mark, volume of sales, promotional 
expenditures, and whether dissemination is widespread); Autozone, 543 
F.3d 933 (Autozone’s mark had “plenty of economic and marketing 
strength” where is was displayed in thousands of retail outlets nationwide, 
supported by millions in marketing expenditures, and in use for decades). 
SunFrog’s reference to the prevalence of skull-like marks in the 
federal trademark register does not meaningfully undermine the strength 
of Harley-Davidson’s mark. See Door Sys., 83 F.3d at 172 (trademark search 
bringing up several marks with “door” in them was neither surprising nor 
dispositive). It was SunFrog’s burden on summary judgment to do more 
than raise metaphysical doubt as to the strength of the marks and the 
differences between the H-D Marks and the infringing products. 
Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. That Harley-Davidson could have submitted 
more evidence showing both strength and similarity, such as expert 
analysis or consumer surveys, (Docket #50 at 25), is beside the point. 
SunFrog could have done the same, and it cannot cover the gap by 
proffering conjecture and speculation. Amadio, 238 F.3d at 927; Palucki, 879 
F.2d at 1572. In sum, there is no competent evidence raising a dispute as to 
whether the marks in question are protectable or that SunFrog’s use of the 
marks anything short of “virtually identical” to their registrations. CAE, 267 
F.3d at 678. As a result, this factor favors Harley-Davidson. 
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 Similarity of the Products; Scope and Manner of Use. SunFrog next 
contends that its use of the marks is not concurrent with or comparable to 
Harley-Davidson’s. (Docket #50 at 25–26). It asserts:  
 The manner in which user-generated designs appear 
on SunFrog’s website, the fact that any design is placed on a 
SunFrog branded shirt from the SunFrong.com [sic] website, 
and the users’ expectation that the designs found there are 
user-generated, weighs against a finding that the designs 
created and uploaded by users of SunFrog’s site create any 
real likelihood of consumer confusion that the t-shirts 
consumers choose to design and print on the SunFrog site 
somehow actually come from H-D. 
Id. This is, again, unhelpful speculation and conjecture about the minds of 
consumers. Moreover, even if a user well understood that designs sold on 
SunFrog’s website are user-generated, there is nothing to suggest that those 
designs are unlicensed. See supra Part 3.2.1.1. Harley-Davidson has shown 
that the parties’ nearly identical products compete directly in the online 
marketplace. See Coach, 2013 WL 2402922, at *5 (noting that the infringer 
sold the same types of items as the mark owner precisely because it offered 
them as knockoffs of the real articles); CAE, 267 F.3d at 681 (courts look to 
whether the products are related in areas of promotion, sales, or 
distribution). That the products may not be identical because SunFrog’s are 
cheaply made is not dispositive. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Nat. Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 
456, 463 (7th Cir. 2000) (courts “are concerned only with whether [the 
products] are similar,” not whether they are the same) (emphasis in 
original). This factor weighs in Harley-Davidson’s favor.  
 Degree of Care Exercised by Consumers. SunFrog writes only two 
sentences on this factor, suggesting that the high quality of Harley-
Davidson’s goods means that consumers of its products “are so discerning 
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that a genuine H-D shirt is purchased with great care in contrast to the 
impulse buy of a user-generated shirt from SunFrog.” (Docket #50 at 26). 
This uncorroborated conviction about consumer care is out of sync with 
applicable precedent, which requires the Court to examine such matters 
“with reference to the realities of consumer behavior in the relevant 
market.” See Dorr-Oliver, Inc. v. Fluid-Quip, Inc., 94 F.3d 376, 381 (7th Cir. 
1996). Even if one accepts that Harley-Davidson’s licensed apparel is high-
quality and more expensive than similar unlicensed apparel, it is 
indisputable that the average retail consumer will not exercise great care 
and discretion in buying ordinary apparel, see GB Elec. Inc. v. Thomas & Betts 
Corp., Civ. A. No. 95-C-0426, 1995 WL 795660, at *6 (E.D. Wis. July 28, 1995), 
unlike, perhaps, costly Coach handbags, Coach, 2013 WL 2402922, at *6. 
Moreover, the degree of care must be assessed not only with respect to those 
discriminating consumers of Harley-Davidson goods, but also as to 
SunFrog’s consumers, who in SunFrog’s own estimation have a low level 
of sophistication. CAE, 267 F.3d at 682; Fuji Photo Film Co., Inc. v. Shinohara 
Shoji Kabushiki Kaisha, 754 F.2d 591, 596 (5th Cir. 1985) (confusion for 
trademark purposes “encompasses confusion on the part of purchasers of 
either (or both) party’s products”) (emphasis in original). Furthermore, 
potential customers who view SunFrog’s infringing products in a post-sale 
environment—that is, out in the world—would almost certainly mistakenly 
think the products are genuine. CAE, 267 at 683. Thus, this factor also 
suggests a likelihood of confusion. 
 Actual Confusion. Harley-Davidson offers no evidence of actual 
confusion to support its trademark claims. It contends that actual confusion 
can be presumed in this case because of the similarity of the products and 
marks, (Docket #44 at 9), but cites no legal authority for this assertion. The 
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presumption arising from the counterfeiting aspect of the case is distinct. 
Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit has opined that “[a]lthough evidence of 
actual confusion, if available, is entitled to substantial weight in the 
likelihood of confusion analysis,. . .this evidence is not required to prove 
that a likelihood of confusion exists.” Id. at 685. This factor is neutral. 
 Palming Off. The final factor asks whether SunFrog intended to palm 
off the products it sold as those of Harley-Davidson. Barbecue Marx, 235 F.3d 
at 1046. This intent requirement “refers to the intent to confuse customers, 
not merely the intent to use a mark that is already in use somewhere else.” 
Meridian Mut. Ins. Co., 128 F.3d at 1120. As has been discussed at length 
already, it is eminently clear that SunFrog tried to pass off its products as 
genuine, licensed Harley-Davidson goods. This is true despite SunFrog’s 
insistence that its goods are of poor quality and its consumers are smart 
enough to know that they are paying for fakes. See Coach, 2013 WL 2402922, 
at *7–8. The goods and marks are identical, or nearly so, which permits an 
inference of intent to confuse. Autozone, 543 F.3d at 934. Indeed, the intent 
to palm off is even more salient in light of the notoriety of Harley-
Davidson’s marks. See Sands, Taylor & Wood, 978 F.2d at 963; Eli Lilly, 233 
F.3d at 465 (finding that obvious wrongful intent can be weighed heavily in 
the overall analysis). 
 Moreover, as observed above, whatever a SunFrog website user 
might think of the product they are buying, SunFrog could not (and does 
not) credibly contend that post-sale confusion is unlikely. The very purpose 
of buying a cheaper, knockoff version of a Harley-Davidson product on 
SunFrog’s website is to create association with the iconic brand at a lower 
cost. See Coach, 2013 WL 2402922, at *8. This runs the risk that consumers 
viewing a knockoff post-sale will see the low quality of the item and be 
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dissuaded from purchasing a real Harley-Davidson product. Id. SunFrog is 
responsible for this confusion and harm to Harley-Davidson’s brand just as 
much as any point-of-sale confusion. CAE, 267 F.3d at 683; Hermes Int’l. v. 
Lederer de Paris Fifth Ave., Inc., 219 F.3d 104, 108 (2d Cir. 2000); Rolex Watch, 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Canner, 645 F. Supp. 484, 495 (S.D. Fla. 1986). 
 Conclusion. SunFrog bore the burden to come forward with evidence 
raising a genuine dispute as to whether the presumption of confusion could 
be rebutted in this counterfeiting case. It did not meet that burden. The 
evidence instead confirms that SunFrog’s “marks” are simply literal or 
stylized reproductions of Harley-Davidson’s iconic word marks and logos, 
used on identical, inexpensive products, in similar channels of 
advertisement and distribution, and with the undeniable intent to pass off 
its goods as genuine. Likelihood of confusion may be a question for the jury 
in most cases, but because nearly all of the relevant factors weigh heavily 
in Harley-Davidson’s favor, this case is the exception. CAE, 267 F.3d at 687 
(affirming district court’s finding that there was a likelihood of confusion 
as a matter of law where most factors weigh distinctly in the plaintiff’s 
favor); Door Sys., 83 F.3d at 172 (“Before [summary judgment] can properly 
be granted,. . .the court must have a very high degree of confidence that any 
disagreement over the facts is spurious.”). 
   3.2.1.4 The Tiffany Defense 
 Convinced that it cannot be liable for direct trademark infringement, 
an assumption which the Court has shown to be mistaken, see supra Parts 
3.2.1.1–3.2.1.2, SunFrog next raises a defense to liability for contributory 
infringement. In Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U.S. 
844, 854 (1982), the Supreme Court concluded that contributory 
infringement occurs when a service provider “intentionally induces 
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another to infringe a trademark” or if the service provider “continues to 
supply its [service] to one whom it knows or has reason to know is engaging 
in trademark infringement.” 
 SunFrog’s defense to this species of trademark liability is grounded 
in the Second Circuit’s 2010 decision in Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 600 F.3d 
93 (2d Cir. 2010). In that case, the Second Circuit addressed a claim brought 
by the famous jewelry maker against the online marketplace. It was 
undisputed that sellers using eBay were listing large numbers of counterfeit 
Tiffany jewelry pieces and that eBay knew this was occurring. Id. at 97. But 
eBay never saw or inspected the merchandise sold on its website, since 
transactions on eBay are consummated directly between seller and buyer; 
thus, its ability to assess whether an item was infringing and to stop it in 
transit was difficult. Id. Moreover, eBay implemented a robust anti-
counterfeiting scheme, with notice-and-takedown measures, a three-strikes 
rule against repeat-offending sellers, and a specialized search engine that 
could be used to identify infringing products. Id. at 98–99.  
 As a result, the Second Circuit concluded that eBay was not 
contributorily liable for the infringing acts of its users. Id. at 107. It was not 
enough that eBay had “a general knowledge or reason to know that its 
service [was] being used to sell counterfeit goods.” Id. Instead, eBay needed 
to have a particularized knowledge of who was infringing and who would 
do so in the future. Id. at 109. Moreover, there was insufficient evidence that 
eBay was being willfully blind to the counterfeit sales on its site. Id. at 110.  
 SunFrog says it is identical to eBay because it has an “industry 
standard notice and takedown procedure.” (Docket #50 at 29). It therefore 
believes that it should be immune to contributory liability. Yet the 
disconnect between SunFrog’s business and eBay’s is hard to overstate. 
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First and foremost, SunFrog is not on the hook in this case for contributory 
infringement, as was the focus in Tiffany. Rather, because SunFrog 
advertises and sells infringing products, operates printers that print the 
products, packs them for shipping, ships them, and then processes 
payment, it is directly liable.  
 Recall that eBay does not make anything, nor does it take goods into 
its custody for shipping. Sellers offer goods that they have bought or made. 
They then ship them to buyers. eBay has little involvement besides bringing 
the parties together for a fee. In fact, eBay had only used Tiffany’s 
trademarks on its website to advertise products; it did not make any jewelry 
nor did it suggest that Tiffany sponsored or endorsed the products it 
advertised. Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 102–03. As a result, the Court of Appeals 
found that there could be no direct trademark liability arising from eBay’s 
limited use of the marks. Id. SunFrog occupies the opposite posture, as it 
does most of the legwork in the transaction for an infringing item, including 
physically placing the H-D Marks on products. If SunFrog is like eBay in 
the sense that its users, and not SunFrog, are the ones generating infringing 
designs, there the similarities end. 
 What is most troubling about the Tiffany defense here is that the 
Court has already rejected it once. In its order denying SunFrog’s motion to 
dismiss, the Court explained that, unlike eBay, “SunFrog operates the very 
printers that print infringing goods, and it does not appear to offer resale of 
goods.” (Docket #40 at 5 n.2). Thus, “[i]ts claim to innocence is far more 
tenuous than eBay’s.” Id. “Indeed,” explained the Court, “eBay would have 
been hard-pressed to defend itself from Tiffany if eBay not only provided a 
platform for the sale of counterfeit [jewelry] but also ran the [] shop that 
made [it].” Id.; see also Tre Milano, LLC v. Amazon.Com, Inc., B234753, 2012 
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WL 3594380, at *11 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 22, 2012) (absolving Amazon in 
hosting sellers of counterfeit goods “because Amazon is a service provider, 
not the seller. Amazon did not currently have any [infringing goods] in its 
own inventory; those it sold belonged to third party sellers. That Amazon 
provided the product description and handled the payments did not make 
it a direct seller of the products.”); Milo & Gabby, LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., 
No. C13–1932RSM, 2015 WL 4394673, at *8–9 (W.D. Wash. July 16, 2015).14 
 Undeterred, SunFrog has resurrected the Tiffany defense in 
opposition to the instant motion. Without directly addressing the Court’s 
earlier decision, SunFrog seems to suggest it was wrong, arguing that 
printing physical products is not analytically distinguishable from the 
offering of digital products, which is how it characterizes eBay’s business. 
(Docket #50 at 30). But this contention, too, relies on the misguided notion 
that SunFrog is merely a print-on-demand service. Id. 
 The Court earlier addressed this claim. “[W]hatever the size or scope 
of SunFrog’s business, it can be charged with knowing what goods come 
off of printers that it owns and operates.” (Docket #40 at 8). “Put 
differently,” said the Court, “SunFrog equates itself with a vending 
machine, producing products at a customer’s order without oversight. But 
the point of this case is that SunFrog in fact operates like a self-aware 
vending machine, with the ongoing ability to monitor the products its users 
order (and that it creates) and to know that those products are infringing.” 
Id. at 9 (citation omitted). Without deciding whether an “entirely automated 
and user-directed” printing service can be liable for printing infringing 
																																																						
 14The Court’s earlier decision contained a clerical error, referring to the 
Tiffany at issue in the Second Circuit case as the lamp maker rather than the 
jewelry maker. Thus, the quotation has been slightly altered, but has no less force. 
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products, (Docket #50 at 30), SunFrog’s business simply cannot be 
described in this way.15 
 Put differently, it is uncontested that one aspect of SunFrog’s 
business is supplying the service of designing custom-made apparel. Yet its 
business goes much further, since it participates in the manufacture and 
distribution of those products as well. Indeed, the Court agrees with 
SunFrog that “physicality of the outcome of the service is not the locus of 
the analysis,” (Docket #50 at 30), but that is half the story. This case is not 
like most contributory infringement suits, where the defendant supplies a 
product to another whom he knows will infringe. See Inwood Labs., 456 U.S. 
at 854. Instead, SunFrog itself is performing the infringing conduct. As a 
result, Tiffany offers SunFrog no respite. 
 Nor does it matter that many of the designs offered on SunFrog’s 
website never translate into physical products. At first glance, this appears 
to bring SunFrog’s situation closer to Tiffany, as it evokes eBay’s contention 
that it only hosted sellers who posted infringing listings, with no 
involvement in the creation of those listings other than advertising them. 
																																																						
 15In its motion to dismiss, SunFrog placed great reliance on the “innocent 
infringer” defense to damages for trademark infringement, codified in Section 
1114(2)(A), which provides that one who is engaged solely in the business of 
printing matter for others can only be subject to injunctive relief, not damages, if 
that matter contains protected marks. See (Docket #40 at 6–9). This argument is 
similar to, but not coextensive with, the Tiffany defense. SunFrog chose not to 
assert the innocent infringer defense in opposition to Harley-Davidson’s summary 
judgment motion, and so the Court considers it waived. See Anderson, 241 F.3d at 
545–46. In any event, a printer cannot be innocent when he acts in reckless 
disregard of whether the matter he prints is infringing. See (Docket #40 at 6–9); 
World Wrestling Fed’n, Inc. v. Posters, Inc., No. 99 C 1806, 2000 WL 1409831, at *3 
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 26, 2000). The undisputed facts in the record would belie any claim 
to this defense that might have been made. 
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Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 102–03. As the Second Circuit found, this use was too 
attenuated to give rise to direct liability. Id. 
 Yet the analogy to Tiffany still fails on the facts. It is undisputed that 
SunFrog is deeply and indispensably involved in the creation of its design 
listings, including offering the software to make them, holding prior 
designs for later use in the All Art database, and aggressively advertising 
those listings through Facebook and other social media. Moreover, SunFrog 
nowhere claims that it would not have produced a listed item if it was 
ordered. Indeed, the opposite is true since, as SunFrog stresses at every 
opportunity, its process is “entirely automated” and its printers print on-
demand. (Docket #50 at 30). Thus, the listings on SunFrog’s website would 
ineluctably lead to the manufacture of infringing products.16  
 These considerations take SunFrog well outside of Tiffany, where 
eBay simply hosted and advertised listings created by others to enable sales 
consummated entirely without eBay’s involvement. In other words, 
whereas eBay was not the entity offering Tiffany jewelry for sale, SunFrog 
undoubtedly is the seller of the apparel and other items on its website. This 
brings it within the broad definition of counterfeiting in the Lanham Act, 
																																																						
 16The Court’s conclusion is bolstered by the fact that SunFrog did not 
contest Harley-Davidson’s infringement analysis submitted in connection with its 
request for statutory damages. See infra Part 3.3.1. There, Harley-Davidson 
supplied a chart that identified types of goods SunFrog offers for sale and 
indicated which H-D Marks had appeared on each type. See (Docket #44 at 23). 
SunFrog had the opportunity to object to this analysis on the ground that some of 
the categories had never actually become a physical product. It did not. Indeed, 
beyond the generalization that many designs do not become manufactured goods, 
SunFrog did not point out a single instance in which this circumstance arose with 
respect to the H-D Marks. 
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which includes not only making but also offering counterfeit goods for sale. 
15 U.S.C. § 1116(d). 
 Furthermore, even assuming SunFrog could bring itself within the 
conceptual framework of Tiffany and avoid direct liability for instances in 
which only a website listing, and not a physical product, is the hook for 
infringement, it would still fail to meet the requirements of the Tiffany 
defense. Recall that in Inwood, the Supreme Court concluded that 
contributory infringement occurs when a service provider “intentionally 
induces another to infringe a trademark” or if the service provider 
“continues to supply its [service] to one whom it knows or has reason to 
know is engaging in trademark infringement.” Inwood Labs., 456 U.S. at 854. 
The Tiffany court analyzed only the second of these two avenues, as Tiffany 
did not contend that eBay induced sellers to infringe. Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 
106. The Court of Appeals determined that the “reason to know” standard 
of Inwood requires “more than a general knowledge or reason to know that 
its service is being used to sell counterfeit goods. Some contemporary 
knowledge of which particular listings are infringing or will infringe in the 
future is necessary.” Id. at 107. Thus, Tiffany could not rest on a generalized 
problem of infringement, which eBay addressed by taking down identified 
infringing listings. Id. at 109. Rather, it should have identified sellers that 
were then selling or would sell counterfeit goods. Id. 
 The Court of Appeals further explained that liability can also arise 
where the service provider, although it does not have specific knowledge 
about a particular would-be infringer, “had reason to suspect that 
counterfeit [] goods were being sold through its website, and intentionally 
shielded itself from discovering the offending listings or the identity of the 
sellers behind them[.]” Id. Relying on Seventh Circuit precedent espousing 
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a similar view, the court said that “[w]hen it has reason to suspect that users 
of its service are infringing a protected mark, [a service provider] may not 
shield itself from learning of the particular infringing transactions by 
looking the other way.” Id. (citing Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. 
Concession Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d 1143, 1149 (7th Cir. 1992)). In the Seventh 
Circuit, such willful blindness is the equivalent of actual knowledge for 
purposes of trademark infringement. Hard Rock Café, 955 F.2d at 1149; Louis 
Vuitton S.A. v. Lee, 875 F.2d 584, 590 (7th Cir. 1989) (finding that “willful 
blindness is knowledge enough” to prove willfulness). 
 Willfulness generally, and willful blindness in particular, are factors 
often discussed in relation to awarding statutory damages. See Rechanik, 249 
F. App’x at 479; Wildlife Exp. Corp. v. Carol Wright Sales, Inc., 18 F.3d 502, 511 
(7th Cir. 1994). In that context, courts find that infringement is willful when 
the infringer knows that its conduct constitutes infringement or acts “in 
reckless disregard” of the owner’s rights. Wildlife Exp. Corp, 18 F.3d at 511; 
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. S & M Cent. Serv. Corp., No. 03 C 4986, 2004 WL 
2534378, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 8, 2004). This can be inferred from a 
defendant’s conduct, including, for instance, that the “defendant ignored 
the plaintiff’s notices[,] did not seek advice of an attorney, and passed the 
matter off as a nuisance.” Lorillard, 2004 WL 2534378, at *4. The Seventh 
Circuit has cautioned that “‘ostrich-like’ business practices amount to 
willful blindness.” Rechanik, 249 F. App’x at 479. 
 These precedents spell doom for SunFrog’s head-in-the-sand 
approach to infringement. First, SunFrog actively markets products bearing 
infringing designs through social media sites like Facebook, and it 
encourages and trains its sellers to do so as well. Indeed, the company 
makes three-quarters or more of its profits through Facebook ad referrals. 
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SunFrog also allows sellers to access the All Art database to retrieve 
infringing designs and peddle goods bearing those designs. Arguably, then, 
it actively induces infringement in the Inwood sense by encouraging users 
to go to its website and create and order infringing goods (which, of course, 
SunFrog itself prints). Inwood, 456 U.S. at 854. 
Second, with respect to the “reason to know” prong of Inwood, 
SunFrog has turned a blind eye to the infringement plaguing its business. 
At the front end, it failed to stop repeat infringers despite knowing their 
identities as a result of numerous takedown notices. Harley-Davidson 
submitted seventy notices in just a few months, covering over 800 
infringing products. Those were removed, but identical or similar designs 
popped up again just as quickly, often by the same designers or sellers. 
Moreover, the removal process frequently took days, despite Harley-
Davidson providing direct links to the offending pages. And all the while, 
SunFrog expanded its apparel offerings, which served to make the 
infringement more pervasive. 
 SunFrog counters that it had difficulty reviewing the surge of new 
designs submitted each day, sometimes numbering in the hundreds of 
thousands, and in responding to the numerous takedown requests it 
received. While SunFrog’s conduct shows that Harley-Davidson’s notices 
were not literally ignored, SunFrog failed time after time to develop reforms 
to its practices that actually addressed the problem in a meaningful way. 
However sunny a view it takes of its efforts to improve its anti-infringement 
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apparatus, the apparatus simply did not work.17 This passage from SunFrog 
is telling:  
SunFrog does not dispute that its anti-infringement tools have 
developed over time and that the system has not been perfect. 
SunFrog’s anti-infringement tools have, however, become 
much more powerful and SunFrog is currently focusing those 
powers on users who may infringe upon Plaintiffs’ asserted 
rights. 
(Docket #51 ¶ 85). Trademark law is not concerned with attempt to avoid 
infringement; it is execution that matters. Ohio State Univ. Skreened Ltd., 16 
F. Supp. 3d 905, 917 (S.D. Ohio 2014) (“Selling knockoffs is selling 
knockoffs, regardless of who suggested you sell them, regardless of how 
many other infringing products you decide not to sell, and regardless of 
how much of a hassle it is to comply with the law.”). SunFrog’s pleas for 
leniency are not congruent with the Lanham Act or SunFrog’s own repeated 
misconduct. Notably, this is not the first time SunFrog has been sued for 
trademark infringement in the very recent past,18 and yet the 
“improvement” efforts continue. 
																																																						
 17SunFrog reports that it has not received any letters from opposing counsel 
since November 2017 notifying it of further instances of infringement. (Docket #50 
at 13). But even if SunFrog has been able to better forestall infringement quite 
recently, it makes no difference to its liability prior to that point. 
 18The following lawsuits were filed against SunFrog between September 
2016 and April 2017, alleging various claims of trademark and copyright 
infringement: (1) Methodist Le Bonheur Healthcare v. SunFrog LLC, No. 2:16-cv-02718 
(W.D. Tenn. 2016); (2) Hamilton Uptown LLC v. SunFrog, LLC, No. 1:2016-cv-834 
(S.D.N.Y. 2016); (3) Siemens Aktiengesellschaft v. SunFrog, LLC, No. 1:16-cv-08411 
(S.D.N.Y. 2016); (4) Bravado Int’l Grp. Merchandising Servs. Inc. & Zion Rootswear, 
LLC v. Sunfrog, LLC, No. 2:16-cv-08657 (C.D. Cal. 2016); (5) Merchdirect LLC v. 
Sunfrog LLC, No. 1:17-cv-00488 (S.D.N.Y. 2017); (6) The Ohio State University v. 
SunFrog, LLC, No. 2:17-cv-00229 (S.D. Ohio 2017); and (7) The Life is Good Company 
v. SunFrog LLC, No. 1:17-cv-10602 (D. Mass. 2017). 
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 Turning to the back end of the process, SunFrog allowed obviously 
infringing goods to come off its own production lines, to be packed and 
shipped by its employees, and then pocketed most of the profits, all without 
investigating the possibility of infringement or the identities of those who 
designed infringing goods. SunFrog knew it did not have a license to use 
the H-D Marks, and only willful blindness could keep it from realizing that 
it was nevertheless selling goods bearing those marks. In Hard Rock Café, 
955 F.2d at 1148–49, the Seventh Circuit opined that a flea market owner 
could potentially be contributorily liable for infringing sales made by 
vendors because he failed to investigate the vendors’ suspicious goods. If 
that is true, then it is hard to believe that SunFrog, whose business involves 
both hosting vendors and manufacturing goods on their behalf, could avoid 
contributory liability.  
 And on this point, it is simply ludicrous for SunFrog to put 
conceptual space between itself and its employees. SunFrog complains that 
it “holds licenses for several properties, ranging from college sports to film 
properties, and individual SunFrog employees who package items as they 
flow out of the printers could not discern between shirt designs that are 
licensed and those that are not.” (Docket #50 at 31). SunFrog is a corporate 
body that has no existence outside its officers and employees. That it does 
not train its workers to spot infringing designs is not a reason to protect it 
from liability. See Chanel, Inc. v. Italian Activewear of Fla., Inc., 931 F.2d 1372, 
1377–78 (11th Cir. 1991) (“Because of its very nature a corporation can act 
only through individuals. ‘Obviously. . .if there was an infringement by the 
corporation, this infringement was caused by some one or more persons 
either officers or employees of the corporation who caused the acts to be 
done.’”) (quoting Mead Johnson & Co. v. Baby's Formula Serv., Inc., 402 F.2d 
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19, 23 (5th Cir. 1968)); Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 285 (2003) (“It is well 
established that traditional vicarious liability rules ordinarily make 
principals or employers vicariously liable for acts of their agents or 
employees in the scope of their authority or employment.”). Perhaps this 
excuse more than any other epitomizes SunFrog’s ostrich-like conception 
of its duties.  
 All this dissembling begins to make sense when one appreciates that 
SunFrog’s business model has been hugely successful. It has grown from 
making a million dollars in its first year to making over $150 million in 2017. 
It has become the largest maker of printed t-shirts in the country and one of 
the most popular websites in the world. It may cut deeply into SunFrog’s 
bottom line to employ comprehensive, thorough anti-infringement policies 
and procedures. But what matters is that SunFrog pleads ignorance while 
sitting atop a mountain of resources that could be deployed to develop 
effective technology, review procedures, or training that would help 
combat infringement. Instead, it chooses to rest upon incongruous legal 
defenses.  
 In short, SunFrog cannot build a business around promoting and 
manufacturing infringing designs and then be freed from liability merely 
because it offers a notice-and-takedown procedure. At best, that theory only 
works when one has no hand in the infringing conduct. Summary judgment 
as to liability is, therefore, appropriate in Harley-Davidson’s favor on its 
claims of federal and state trademark infringement, counterfeiting, and 
false designation of origin—Counts One, Two, Three, Six, and Seven of the 
complaint. See (Docket #1); (Docket #44 at 4 n.1). 
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  3.2.2 Dilution 
 Harley-Davidson’s remaining trademark claim, Count Four of the 
complaint, is for dilution, which is similar to the other claims but rests upon 
the additional finding that the marks in question are famous. Of the H-D 
Marks, the marks claimed to be famous are HARLEYDAVIDSON, 
HARLEY, H-D, HD, and the Bar & Shield logo (referred to collectively as 
the “Famous Marks”). To succeed on its dilution claim, Harley-Davidson 
must show that: (1) these marks are distinctive and famous; (2) SunFrog’s 
promotion and sale of infringing products began after the Famous Marks 
became famous; and (3) the infringing products are likely to dilute the 
distinctiveness of the Famous Marks and their ability to identify and 
distinguish Harley-Davidson’s goods and services. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1); 
H-D USA LLC v. Mayo, No. 14-CV-654-JPS, 2016 WL 7839144, at *2 (E.D. 
Wis. June 10, 2016). The purpose of a dilution claim, in contrast to a 
standard infringement claim, is to protect owners of famous marks from the 
erosion of the prestige and distinctiveness of their brand. Eli Lilly, 233 F.3d 
at 466. 
   3.2.2.1 The Marks Are Distinctive and Famous 
 To be famous, a mark must be “widely recognized by the general 
consuming public of the United States as a designation of source of the 
goods or services of the mark’s owner.” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A). Courts 
may consider all relevant factors in determining fame, including: (1) the 
duration, extent, and geographic reach of advertising and publicity of the 
mark; (2) the amount, volume, and geographic extent of sales of goods and 
services offered under the mark; (3) the extent of actual recognition of the 
mark; and (4) whether the mark is registered. Id. Importantly, fame for 
purposes of dilution is considered in relation to the American general 
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public, not a potential niche market for a product. Top Tobacco, L.P. v. N. Atl. 
Operating Co., Ltd., 509 F.3d 380, 384 (7th Cir. 2007). The mark must be so 
well-known as to be a “household name” which is “immediately familiar 
to very nearly everyone, everywhere in the nation.” 4 McCarthy § 24:104. 
 Applying these principles to the Famous Marks, it is beyond 
question that they are famous. First, they have been continuously and 
widely used throughout the United States for decades, and some for over 
100 years. Second, Harley-Davidson and its licensees have sold many 
billions of dollars of products and services under these marks, and spent 
many millions of dollars extensively promoting them. Third, the Famous 
Marks have attracted wide and unsolicited media attention. Fourth, Harley-
Davidson owns numerous federal registrations for the Famous Marks 
covering a variety of products and services. Most of these registrations, 
including those covering apparel, are incontestable, and thus constitute 
conclusive evidence of their validity and Harley-Davidson’s ownership of 
those marks. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b). In fact, several courts and the Trademark 
Trial and Appeal Board have previously observed that two of the marks at 
issue, HARLEY-DAVIDSON and the Bar & Shield logo, are famous, though 
not in the strict sense contemplated in Section 1125(c)(2)(A). See, e.g., 
Packaging Supplies, Inc. v. Harley-Davidson, Inc., No. 08–cv–400, 2011 WL 
1811446, at *7 (N.D. Ill. May 12, 2011); H-D Mich. LLC v. Bryan C. Broehm, 
Application No. 78896325, 2009 WL 1227921, at *5 (T.T.A.B. Apr. 28, 2009). 
Accordingly, the Famous Marks are distinctive and famous such that they 
can form a basis for a dilution claim.  
 SunFrog contests this conclusion, arguing that material questions of 
fact exist as to the fame of the Famous Marks, particularly as to HD and H-
D. The Court is not persuaded, however, as much of the argument rests on 
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SunFrog’s speculation about potential holes in the evidence, born of its 
failure to take discovery in order to mount an evidence-based challenge. 
SunFrog claims that 
[i]t is doubtful. . .that two-letter marks such as H-D and HD 
could obtain the household recognition needed to be 
considered famous for the purposes of a dilution analysis. 
Plaintiffs must provide more than their affidavits to support 
a finding that H-D’s Famous Marks, as defined in Plaintiffs’ 
brief, are famous in the dilution context. And SunFrog should 
be able to test that evidence through discovery and the 
adverse [sic] process of the American judicial system.  
(Docket #50 at 35). SunFrog cites no evidence casting the doubt on which it 
relies, and so it is SunFrog’s opposition, and not Harley-Davidson’s 
evidence, which is impermissibly conclusory. Amadio, 238 F.3d at 927. 
 Moreover, SunFrog’s reliance on Miramar Brands Group, Inc. v. 
Fonoimoana, Case No. CV 16-4224 PSG (RAOx), 2017 WL 2903256 (C.D. Cal. 
June 13, 2017), is misplaced. There, the district court stressed that “fame” is 
a demanding standard. Id. at *10; 4 McCarthy § 24:104 (“All ‘trademarks' 
are ‘distinctive’—very few are ‘famous’.”). In the case before it, the court 
concluded that the plaintiff had not come forward with sufficient evidence 
to prove that its marks, which related to volleyball products and apparel, 
were famous. Miramar, 2017 WL 2903256, at *10.  
 To meet its burden, the plaintiff relied upon the fact that its marks 
had been registered for more than thirty years and that its brands had 
earned millions of dollars in licensing revenues and royalties. Id. The court 
reasoned that the mere existence of a registration is not strong evidence of 
fame. Id. Moreover, evidence of large sales revenues is not enough to prove 
that the marks are indeed household names. Id. In other words, bandying 
around high dollar amounts cannot equate to a showing that the marks are 
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well-recognized among the general public. Id.; Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan 
Computer Corp., 378 F.3d 1002, 1012 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 SunFrog is correct that, like the plaintiff in Miramar, Harley-
Davidson has no consumer surveys demonstrating its recognition among 
the purchasing public. But the evidence Harley-Davidson has marshalled 
is overwhelming in comparison to the generalizations offered in that case. 
If the relevant inquiry is ultimately whether the marks in question are 
household names, there can be no comparison between the Miramar 
marks—“King of the Beach” and “Queen of the Beach” for volleyball-
related goods—and Harley-Davidson’s world-renowned marks. Although 
the plaintiff in Miramar could only show that it was famous among the 
volleyball-enthusiast set, no member of the American public could 
encounter HARLEYDAVIDSON, HARLEY, H-D, HD, and the Bar & Shield 
logo without first thinking of the iconic motorcycle company. Coach Servs., 
Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2012). And even 
if this conclusion might be less sure with respect to H-D and HD, SunFrog 
has offered nothing more than supposition to contest it. 
 Moreover, where the Miramar plaintiff owned its marks for decades 
and spent several million dollars in promoting them, Harley-Davidson has 
owned some of the Famous Marks for over 100 years and has earned billions 
in sales after spending millions in promotional efforts. In short, the two 
cases are not in the same league. Instead, this case is far closer to Visa Int’l 
Serv. Ass’n v. JSL Corp., 590 F. Supp. 2d 1306, 1315 (D. Nev. 2008), where the 
court found that decades of worldwide promotion and over a trillion 
dollars in sales volume rendered the VISA mark famous. Thus, the Court 
finds that the Famous Marks are famous as a matter of law. 
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    3.2.2.2 Remaining Elements of Dilution Claim 
 SunFrog does not contest any element of Harley-Davidson’s dilution 
claim except the fame of the marks. (Docket #50 at 34–35). The Court will 
recount the evidence on the remaining elements for the sake of 
completeness, but because SunFrog has conceded them, it does so only 
briefly. See Wojtas v. Capital Guardian Trust Co., 477 F.3d 924, 926 (7th Cir. 
2007) (plaintiff waived right to challenge statute of limitations defense by 
failing to oppose that argument in response to motion to dismiss); 
Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. E. Atl. Ins. Co., 260 F.3d 742, 747 (7th Cir. 2001) 
(plaintiff’s failure to mention defendant’s argument regarding scope of 
insurance policy exclusion treated as “acquiescence” to defendant’s 
interpretation, rendering unnecessary any substantive determination by 
the court). First, it is undisputed that SunFrog began promoting, 
advertising, offering for sale, and selling its infringing products in October 
2016, long after the Famous Marks became famous. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1). 
 Second, Harley-Davidson has established both recognized types of 
dilution—“dilution by blurring” and “dilution by tarnishment.” Mayo, 2016 
WL 7839144, at *2. “Dilution by blurring” is the “association arising from 
the similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that 
impairs the distinctiveness of the famous mark.” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B). 
It occurs when consumers “see the plaintiff’s mark used on a plethora of 
different goods and services, raising the possibility that the mark will lose 
its ability to serve as a unique identifier of the plaintiff’s product.” Eli Lilly, 
233 F.3d at 466. The Lanham Act sets out a non-exclusive list of factors for 
courts to consider to determine whether dilution by blurring is likely to 
occur: (1) the similarities between the marks; (2) the degree of inherent or 
acquired distinctiveness of the famous mark; (3) the extent to which the 
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plaintiff is engaging in substantially exclusive use of the famous mark; (4) 
the degree of recognition of the famous mark; (5) the defendant’s intent to 
create association with the famous mark; and (6) any actual association 
between the marks. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B). Here, SunFrog used identical 
or materially indistinguishable variations of the Famous Marks, those 
marks are distinctiveness and famous, and SunFrog intended to create an 
association with the Famous Marks to trade on Harley-Davidson’s fame 
and goodwill. See Mayo, 2016 WL 7839144, at *2 (noting that “[defendant’s] 
sale of counterfeit products bearing HD’s marks clearly intends to use that 
long-developed goodwill for its own profit” and constituted dilution by 
blurring). 
 The other type of dilution, dilution by tarnishment, “is association 
arising from the similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous 
mark that harms the reputation of the famous mark.” 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1125(c)(2)(C). Here, tarnishment has occurred in several ways. First, 
SunFrog’s cheaply made, knockoff products fall well below the quality 
standards that Harley-Davidson has long set for its licensees, harming its 
reputation with the purchasing public. See Rolex Watch U.S.A., 645 F. Supp. 
at 494–95. As the Seventh Circuit has explained, “[i]f [a] seller provides an 
inconsistent level of quality, or reduces quality below what consumers 
expect from earlier experience, that reduces the value of the trademark.” 
Scandia Down Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc., 772 F.2d 1423, 1430 (7th Cir. 1985). 
 Second, even if SunFrog’s products met Harley-Davidson’s quality 
control standards, many of them would not meet its content criteria. Many 
of the offending products include vulgar, political, or religious content that 
Harley-Davidson would not have approved to appear on licensed 
products. Others modify or mutilate the H-D Marks, or display marks that 
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Harley-Davidson does not license, which again Harley-Davidson would 
not have approved of. There is perhaps no greater tarnishment of a famous 
brand than using it in an unauthorized way that likely will offend potential 
purchasers of genuine goods. Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 43 
(2d Cir. 1994) (tarnishment occurs “when the plaintiff’s trademark is linked 
to products of shoddy quality, or is portrayed in an unwholesome or 
unsavory context likely to evoke unflattering thoughts about the owner’s 
product”). Thus, the Court finds that summary judgment is appropriate on 
Harley-Davidson’s dilution claim. 
 3.3 Remedy 
  3.3.1 Statutory Damages on the Counterfeiting Claim 
 When a plaintiff succeeds in proving counterfeiting, as opposed to 
mere infringement, of his trademarks, he may elect to receive an award of 
statutory damages in lieu of actual damages. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c). The 
Lanham Act provides the following outer boundaries for statutory 
damages awards:  
(1)	not less than $1,000 or more than $200,000 per counterfeit 
mark per type of goods or services sold, offered for sale, or 
distributed, as the court considers just; or  
(2) if the court finds that the use of the counterfeit mark was 
willful, not more than $2,000,000 per counterfeit mark per 
type of goods or services sold, offered for sale, or distributed, 
as the court considers just.  
Id. The statute’s reference to “type of goods” means just that—the statutory 
damages award must be made per type of infringing good,	 “not per 
individual item bearing the counterfeit mark.” Gabbanelli Accordions & 
Imports, L.L.C. v. Gabbanelli, 575 F.3d 693, 698 (7th Cir. 2009). 
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 To receive statutory damages, the plaintiff must establish not only 
counterfeiting but also that the marks in question are registered for use on 
the same goods or services for which the defendant used the marks. 15 
U.S.C. § 1116(d)(1)(B); Coach, 2013 WL 2402922, at *9. Harley-Davidson 
acknowledges that a few of its federal registrations do not cover all of the 
types of counterfeit goods sold by SunFrog. (Docket #44 at 23). Thus, the 
Court will not consider those goods in reaching a statutory damages award. 
As to those for which there is a registration, the counterfeiting liability 
established above paves the way for a statutory damages award. But before 
determining the appropriate quantum of damages, the Court must decide 
the permissible range for the award—i.e., whether the infringement here is 
willful. 
   3.3.1.1 Willfulness 
 The Court earlier explained that infringement is willful when the 
infringer knows that it is infringing or acts “in reckless disregard” of that 
possibility. Wildlife Exp. Corp., 18 F.3d at 511. To find knowing infringement, 
“willful blindness is knowledge enough.” Lee, 875 F.2d at 590; Hard Rock 
Cafe, 955 F.2d at 1149. A defendant’s conduct can support an inference of 
knowledge, including when the “defendant ignored the plaintiff’s notices[,] 
did not seek advice of an attorney, and passed the matter off as a nuisance.” 
Lorillard, 2004 WL 2534378, at *4. 
 In rejecting the Tiffany defense, the Court discussed at length why 
SunFrog’s pre-suit conduct epitomized a head-in-the-sand approach to 
infringement. See supra Part 3.2.1.4; Rechanik, 249 F. App’x at 479. The Court 
will not retread that ground. However, a few observations about SunFrog’s 
post-suit conduct are in order, as they bolster the contention that “willful” 
is the only appropriate way to describe SunFrog’s conduct. 
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 First, SunFrog lied in opposition to Harley-Davidson’s motion for 
preliminary injunction. It said it had implemented procedures to stop 
infringement from occurring, but Harley-Davidson showed that this was 
untrue. Second, SunFrog violated the Court’s preliminary injunction 
several times, despite numerous letters from counsel for Harley-Davidson 
regarding continued offerings of infringing goods. SunFrog makes much of 
Harley-Davidson’s failure to send a pre-suit demand letter, claiming this 
could all have been worked out amicably. But if SunFrog will not comply 
with this Court’s injunction, what good would a letter have done? See Sara 
Lee Corp. v. Bags of N.Y., Inc., 36 F. Supp. 2d 161, 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (finding 
that the defendants’ persistence in infringing despite court orders meant 
they were “difficult to deter”).   
 As it tacitly concedes that infringement has continued even after a 
lawsuit and an injunction, SunFrog claims it is trying its best to develop a 
more robust anti-infringement protocols. But SunFrog did not come to 
court on bended knee, like eBay did in Tiffany, hoping to join in the effort 
to curb trademark infringement. See Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 98. SunFrog came 
in fighting, apparently hoping to defend its business model on legal 
theories of dubious value. In other words, although eBay sought to defend 
its reputation as a safe place to do business, id., SunFrog battled for its right 
to exploit infringement for profit. Moreover, even when it does try to show 
off its burgeoning capability to detect and deter infringement, SunFrog 
maintains that the process has been more expensive and cumbersome than 
it likes. 
 One need only consider SunFrog’s lackluster defense at summary 
judgment to know that it had little chance of succeeding in this lawsuit. The 
Court cataloged SunFrog’s failure to raise more than a handful of factual 
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disputes, and none concerning material facts. It also thoroughly explained 
why SunFrog’s legal theories do not hold water. Rather than roll up its 
sleeves from the start to develop and implement anti-infringement 
practices that actually worked, SunFrog tried to avoid liability entirely by 
pointing the finger at everyone else involved. But trademark law is 
practical, and its doctrines fit the realities of the marketplace. In law, as in 
business, cleverness and technicality are poor substitutes for hard work and 
honesty. SunFrog willfully counterfeited Harley-Davidson’s marks. 
   3.3.1.2 The Appropriate Damages Award 
 The Court next considers what amount of statutory damages is 
appropriate. There is no rigid formula for calculating statutory damages; 
instead, courts enjoy broad discretion in selecting an appropriate figure. See 
Chi-Boy Music v. Charlie Club, Inc., 930 F.2d 1224, 1229 (7th Cir. 1991); 
Lorillard, 2004 WL 2534378, at *4. Courts consult various factors in this 
endeavor, such as “the difficulty or impossibility of proving actual 
damages, the circumstances of the infringement, and the efficacy of the 
damages as a deterrent.” Chi-Boy, 930 F.2d at 1229. Statutory damages can 
fill an important role when compensatory damages would be “too slight to 
warrant the expense of determining but deterrence would be served by a 
money judgment.” Gabbanelli, 575 F.3d at 698. Thus, “an award of statutory 
damages serves dual interests in that it is remedial in nature but also 
intended to protect an important public interest” in deterring 
counterfeiting. Deckers Outdoor Corp. v. Does 1–55, No. 11 C 10, 2011 WL 
4929036, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 14, 2011) (citing Sands, Taylor & Wood, 34 F.3d 
at 1348); Rolls Royce PLC v. Rolls-Royce USA, Inc., 688 F. Supp. 2d 150, 157 
(E.D.N.Y. 2010); Coach, Inc. v. Zhen Zhen Weng, No. 13 CIV 445, 2014 WL 
2604032, at *18 (S.D.N.Y. June 9, 2014). Courts calculating statutory 
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damages also consider the value of the plaintiff’s brand and its efforts to 
protect the brand. Lorillard, 2004 WL 2534378, at *6.  
 To reach the appropriate quantum of damages in this case, the Court 
must first address SunFrog’s threshold suggestion that statutory damages 
are entirely unwarranted. SunFrog complains that Harley-Davidson failed 
to tailor its request for statutory damages to its actual loss or SunFrog’s 
actual profits, based on sales data and financial information SunFrog has 
produced in discovery. (Docket #50 at 10, 14).  
 This argument goes too far. Actual profits or losses can be relevant 
in the wide-ranging search for a just damages award, but it must be 
remembered that the Lanham Act gives plaintiffs in counterfeiting cases the 
option to seek statutory damages instead of actual damages. Rolls-Royce, 
688 F. Supp. 2d at 158; Versace v. Awada, No. CV033254, 2010 WL 11515467, 
at *4 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2010). Many courts have rejected the plea that the 
infringer’s actual profits were fairly low. See, e.g., Diane Von Furstenberg 
Studio v. Snyder, No. 1:06CV1356, 2007 WL 3143690, at *5 (E.D. Va. Oct. 23, 
2007), aff’d, 294 F. App’x 10 (4th Cir. 2008). This is particularly true for cases 
like this one, where rampant infringement with low-quality counterfeits 
did not simply deprive Harley-Davidson of profit but also damaged its 
brand and reputation. See id.; H-D U.S.A., LLC v. Guangzhou Tomas Crafts 
Co., Ltd., Case No. 16-cv-10096, 2017 WL 6733685, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 18, 
2017). SunFrog’s argument is unavailing.19 
																																																						
 19For these reasons, the Court finds less persuasive the suggestion filtering 
through some district court opinions that “[s]tatutory damages should represent 
some approximation of actual damages and are not to represent a windfall to a 
prevailing plaintiff.” Coach, Inc. v. Treasure Box, Inc., No. 3:11CV468–PPS, 2014 WL 
888902, at *4 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 6, 2014). No court seeks to give a party a windfall, but 
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 The Court can now turn to the factors that inform its damages 
determination. Notably, while SunFrog argues that statutory damages are 
not appropriate, and that the damages requested are too high, it has not 
challenged in any way Harley-Davidson’s demonstration that there are 
sixty-four different types of goods bearing different H-D Marks. See (Docket 
#44 at 22–26). Thus, the Court accepts Harley-Davidson’s accounting on 
that score as unopposed, noting parenthetically that it is also consistent 
with the decisions of numerous district courts in similar cases. See, e.g., Rolls 
Royce, 688 F. Supp. 21 at 159.  
 Statutory damages awards in district courts across the country vary 
widely. For instance, the court in Nike, Inc. v. Top Brand Co., No. 00 Civ. 
8179(KMW)(RLE), 2006 WL 2946472, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2006), awarded 
the then-maximum of $1 million per mark, per type of infringing good, for 
a total award of $17 million, in a case against a large-scale infringer that 
produced millions of infringing goods and committed numerous abuses of 
the litigation process. In Sara Lee, the award was $750,000 per mark per type 
of good where the infringing operation was a sizable handbag shop and 
showroom in New York City and the defendant-owner continued 
counterfeiting even after litigation began. Sara Lee, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 169. In 
Coach, the total award for twenty-four types of goods sold by a small New 
York gift shop was $500,000, in view of the small size of the operation as 
against the fact that the defendants continued to sell counterfeits despite 
numerous arrests for the same and attempted to conceal their operations. 
Coach, 2014 WL 2604032, at *19. As one can see, the awards are all over the 
																																																						
statutory damages simply do not serve the same functions as compensatory 
damages. 
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map, and perhaps rightly so, since the award is meant to be tailored to the 
facts of the case at hand.20 
 Without much consistency in the decisions of sister courts, this Court 
rests primarily on its own exercise of discretion in light of the relevant 
analytical factors. First, actual damages are likely hard to prove in this case. 
Chi-Boy, 930 F.2d at 1229. SunFrog suggests—without citation to evidence—
that the total sales for infringing goods is less than $250,000, (Docket #50 at 
14), but this does not account for the significant potential for damage to 
Harley-Davidson’s goodwill and reputation through the dissemination of 
cheaply made, knockoff goods bearing offensive or mutilated settings of its 
trademarks—marks that it has developed and strengthened over decades 
of exposure and expenditure. Lorillard, 2004 WL 2534378, at *6. Moreover, 
the Lanham Act allows statutory damages to be large even when actual 
damages are small, for the very reason that deterring counterfeiting is 
important. Gabbanelli, 575 F.3d at 698. This is especially critical when the 
infringer utilizes the capacity of the internet to effect enormous, rapid 
distribution of counterfeit goods. See Burberry LTD. & Burberry USA v. 
Designers Imports, Inc., No. 07 Civ. 3997(PAC), 2010 WL 199906, at *10–11 
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2010). That said, though SunFrog has become a massive 
company, drawing revenues in the hundreds of millions of dollars, the 
actual profit from these specific goods appears to be low. Nike, 2006 WL 
2946472, at *2 (noting that maximum statutory damages award was 
appropriate where infringer had a large operation and millions of 
infringing goods were produced). 
																																																						
 20This Court entered an award of $2 million per mark per type of goods in 
Mayo, 2016 WL 7839144, at *2, but the Court does not find that decision persuasive 
in the present context because the request for that award was unopposed.  
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 Second, as examined in detail throughout this opinion, the 
circumstances of SunFrog’s infringement are deeply troubling. Chi-Boy, 930 
F.2d at 1229. SunFrog seems to have developed a business that facilitated 
blatant infringement of others’ intellectual property rights on the 
misguided notion that it was immune to liability as a “service provider” 
that offered a notice-and-takedown procedure. See (Docket #50 at 12) 
(contending that damages are unwarranted because SunFrog is “utiliz[ing] 
cutting edge technology to provide consumers with opportunities that 
could not have existed even a few years ago”). 
 This is incorrect. Instead, the law as applied to SunFrog 
demonstrates that it endeavored to trade on Harley-Davidson’s goodwill 
by selling knockoffs of its licensed apparel and other items. See Coach, 2014 
WL 2604032, at *18; Microsoft Corp. v. CMOS Tech., Inc., 872 F. Supp. 1329, 
1335 (D.N.J. 1994) (“It would be difficult to imagine a clearer case of 
consumer confusion than the instant case in which the defendants, acting 
in direct competition with the plaintiff, sold counterfeit products on which 
plaintiff’s registered marks appear in their entirety.”). As the Court earlier 
explained, simply applying SunFrog’s own mark to the goods did not 
dispel that confusion but more likely only increased it. 
 Further, SunFrog repeatedly violated Harley-Davidson’s rights and 
orders of the Court. See Sara Lee, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 168–69 (finding that 
infringer’s repeated efforts to mislead the court about ceasing infringement 
supported a high damages award); Coach, 2014 WL 2604032, at *3. It has not 
been sanctioned for its litigation conduct, as in Sara Lee, nor is there 
evidence that it has tried to cover up its operations, as in Coach, but the fact 
remains that SunFrog only begrudgingly dragged its feet down the path to 
compliance. It is therefore deserving of a sanction to deter it from 
Case 2:17-cv-00711-JPS   Filed 04/12/18   Page 77 of 81   Document 71
Page 78 of 81 
continuing its business model and to discourage others from making 
similarly underprepared ventures. See Rolls Royce, 688 F. Supp. 2d at 157. 
The public, too, would be served by a weighty damages award, to serve as 
a warning to those who operate businesses over the internet that with the 
hope of skyrocketing success should come the awareness that rights holders 
need not await the end of corporate growing pains. Deckers, 2011 WL 
4929036, at *5. 
 All that said, the Court finds that this is not a case for an award 
anywhere near the statutory maximum. By volume, this case implicates 
more types of infringing goods than nearly any other case the Court could 
locate. Given the need to multiply any damages figure by sixty-four in order 
to arrive at a final award, the Court is mindful that deterrence, 
compensation, and the public interest do not require an award that would 
instantaneously shutter SunFrog’s operations, as an award of $128 million 
likely would.  
 Additionally, though SunFrog is undoubtedly a counterfeiter, it did 
not try to pass off its entire business as a fraud, such as occurred in Rolls-
Royce, 688 F. Supp. 2d at 157. The Court agrees with SunFrog that most cases 
involving a maximum award of statutory damages involve “actual 
counterfeiters who manufactured expensive counterfeit luxury goods and 
then sold through illicit channels.” Coach, 2014 WL 2604032, at *18–19. 
SunFrog certainly is not a company comprised of career criminals.  
 Finally, while the evolution of SunFrog’s anti-infringement 
procedures and technology is not relevant to the underlying question of 
infringement, it does persuade the Court that SunFrog has made slow but 
significant progress in conforming its conduct to the requirements of the 
law. This removes it still further from the rampant, continuing infringement 
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at issue in many of the cases Harley-Davidson cites. Indeed, the 
infringement at issue in this case appears to have lasted only a few years or 
less. And the task before SunFrog has not been easy, as the explosive 
growth of its business has meant a daily downpour of design submissions 
and infringement perpetrated by computer programs rather than 
individuals. (Docket #50 at 12–13). 
 For these reasons, the Court, having considered the entire factual 
record in this case, along with the pertinent legal authorities, finds that a 
just award of statutory damages in this case is $300,000 per mark per type 
of counterfeit good, for a total statutory damages award of $19,200,000. 
  3.3.2 Permanent Injunction 
 In addition to statutory damages, Harley-Davidson requests that the 
Court convert its preliminary injunction into a permanent one. (Docket #44 
at 28). To obtain a permanent injunction, the plaintiff must demonstrate 
that: (1) it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) remedies available at law, 
such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; 
(3) considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and 
defendant, an injunctive remedy is warranted; and (4) the public interest 
would not be disserved by a permanent injunction. eBay Inc. v. 
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006); Mayo, 2016 WL 7839144 at *2.  
 Harley-Davidson has made a prima facie showing as to each of these 
elements. (Docket #44 at 28–30). As the Court has previously noted, because 
of the difficulty in quantifying damage to the reputation or goodwill of a 
mark holder, courts presume irreparable harm and the inadequacy of legal 
remedies in Lanham Act cases. (Docket #33 at 3); Promatek Indus., Ltd. v. 
Equitrac Corp., 300 F.3d 808, 813 (7th Cir. 2002); Meridian Mut. Ins. Co., 128 
F.3d at 1120. Further, Harley-Davidson contends that because of the 
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obviousness of SunFrog’s counterfeiting operation, the ongoing harm to 
Harley-Davidson’s brand, and SunFrog’s ability to continue its business 
selling non-infringing goods, the balance of harms favors it here. (Docket 
#44 at 29–30). Finally, Harley-Davidson points out that injunctions in 
trademark cases are generally found to serve the public interest because 
they protect the public from confusion about the products they purchase. 
Int’l Kennel Club, 846 F.2d at 1092 n.8; Promatek Indus., 300 F.3d at 813–14. 
 SunFrog did not respond to any of these arguments. Indeed, it 
mentions the word “injunction” nowhere in its brief. Consequently, even if 
SunFrog could mount an effective defense to the need for an injunction—
which is quite unlikely—it has conceded the issue. Wojtas, 477 F.3d at 926; 
Cincinnati Ins. Co., 260 F.3d at 747. The Court will grant a permanent 
injunction along with its damages award. That permanent injunction will 
be issued as a separate order entered contemporaneously with this Order. 
4.  CONCLUSION  
For the reasons stated above, the Court finds that it must largely 
grant Harley-Davidson’s motion for partial summary judgment. It finds in 
Harley-Davidson’s favor as to SunFrog’s liability on Counts One, Two, 
Three, Four, Six, and Seven of the complaint. As to Count One, the 
counterfeiting claim, the Court further awards statutory damages in the 
amount of $19,200,000. Finally, as to all of the trademark and unfair 
competition claims, including the counterfeiting claim, the Court further 
finds it appropriate to enter a permanent injunction against SunFrog’s 
continued infringement. 
The Court’s disposition of the issues leaves only two matters for trial: 
(1) the amount of compensatory damages, if any, to award for any non-
counterfeiting acts of infringement covered by Counts Two, Three, Four, 
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Six, and Seven; and (2) liability and damages on Harley-Davidson’s claim 
of copyright infringement, which is Count Five of the complaint. 
Accordingly, 
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment 
(Docket #43) be and the same is hereby GRANTED in part as stated herein;  
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ motion to file under seal 
certain exhibits submitted in connection with their motion (Docket #42) be 
and the same is hereby GRANTED; and 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs be and the same are 
hereby AWARDED statutory damages in the amount of $19,200,000 as to 
Count One of their Complaint, counterfeiting under the Lanham Act. Entry 
of judgment on that count will await complete disposition of all of the 
claims in this action. 
 Dated at Milwaukee, Wisconsin, this 12th day of April, 2018. 
      BY THE COURT: 
 
 
      __________________ 
      J. P. Stadtmueller 
      U.S. District Judge 
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